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NOT AT THE BEHEST OF NONLABOR GROUPS:
A REVISED PROGNOSIS FOR A
MATURING SPORTS INDUSTRYt
PHILLIP

J.

CLOSIUS *

For over 100 years, Americans have willingly paid to watch sporting
events. Professional athletics - led by baseball - began with teams composed
'I)f an area's best players staging local exhibitions for hometown crowds. These
squads gradually developed into touring groups of professionals and then a
collective group of teams based in different cities, regularly playing each
other.1 Team owners found that concerted action in this league format enabled
them to market nationally their players' skills. Stimulated by increased attention from the media and public, professional sports evolved from a group of
individuals staging exhibitions into a major entertainment industry possessing
significant economic power. 2 As the wealth and publicity associated with sports
has grown, the components of the new sports industry, seeking to 'share some
portion of that influence, also have changed. For much of its history, professional sports were controlled by team owners operating collectively as a league.
Players were individually employed by these owners and rarely acted collectively. Over the past fifteen years, however, this infrastructure has been altered
significandy. Owners and their leagues are now counterbalanced by players,
their agents, and the players' collective associations, unions. This development
has gradually limited the unilateral ability of the owners to control professional
sports and forced a sharing of power among the industry's various members.
The change was partially induced by the broadcast industry which, reflecting

t Copyright © 1983 by PhillipJ. Closius.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. A.B., University
of Notre Dame (1972); J.D., Columbia (1975).
The author wishes to express his thanks for the research assistance of qarol Nordholt, University of Toledo College of Law, 1982, and the preparation assistance of Linda
Whalen.
1 The National League of Baseball, the first organized sports league, was formed in
1876. For a further discussion, see Berry and Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of
Players, Owners, Brawls and Strikes, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 685, 695 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Berry and Gould].
2 Although figures on league income are difficult to ascertain, the National Football
League Players Association ("NFLPA") contends that in 1980 the National Football League
("NFL") alone had gross revenues of $400,680,000. NFLPA PAMPHLET, Why a Percentage of the
Gross? Because WeAre the Game, at 9 (Sept. 1981) (available at Boston College Law School Library)
[hereinafter cited as NFLPA PAMPHLET]. The Green Bay Packers, a public corporation which
reports its income, noted a pre-tax 1980 profit figure of $2,110,283 on a total income of
$11,276,814. The Packers' balance sheet for that year also reveals $10,462,276 in short term investments. See Christl,' Packer profits down, but still top $1 million, Green Bay Press-Gazette, May 5,
1981, § c, at 1. For a more detailed discussion on the total economic picture of professional
sports, see Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 691-710.
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the continuing public fascination with sports, has been increasingly interested
in additional sports programming. The dramatically increased revenues
engendered by nationwide media exposure has altered the monetary positions
and expectations of both owners and players.s In addition, access to the courtroom and a changing judicial perception of the legal status of sports have effectuated the change in the structure of sports and influenced the shift in its internal balance of power.
Judicial attitudes toward professional athletics can be divided analytically
into two distinct time periods. The initial attitude of the courts, influential from
the late 1800's until 1972, characterized sports as games, performed for the
amusement of the country. Professional leagues were "therefore not subject to
the same degree of legal scrutiny and liability applicable to commercial
endeavors.4 Due to its position as the country's first national sports league, the
sport of baseball was the chief beneficiary of this judicial posture of benign
neglect. In an early decision, Federal Baseball Club oj Baltimore, Inc. v. National
League, 5 the United States Supreme Court established the foundation for this
reasoning by deciding that bas"eball, as played in the early 1920's, was not interstate commerce. 6 The game was therefore entitled to an immunity from the
proscriptions of the Sherman Act. 7 Flood v. Kuhns was the last major opinion to
accept this interpretation of sports' legal status. The Supreme Court there
ruled that baseball retained the antitrust immunity granted it by Federal
Baseball. In addition to the apparent incongruity of continuing the application
of such reasoning to baseball in the 1970's, the tone of the Flood opinion

3 The broadcast industry reflects the country's apparently insatiable interest in watching sports. The NFL's current television contract will provide the league with $2,000,000,000
over the five year period from 1982-1987. See Eskenazi, N.F.L. TV Pact 82 Billion, N.Y. Times,
March 23, 1982, at D23. The expanding cable television market assures greater media revenues
in the future for sports. A new professional football league, the United States Football Leagui:,
achieved instant credibility by signing a reported two-year, $20,000,000 contract with the ABCTV network and augmented that revenue by signing an additional broadcast contract with a
cable network. See Castle, Pact with USFL (~ Winner" fOT ESPN, 16 PRO FOOTBALL WEEKLY,
No.1, at 54 (Aug. 1982).
• See, e.g., Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); American
League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Philadelphia Base-Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 10 Pa. Dist. Rpts. 309 (1901), rev'd, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A.
973 (1902).
s 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
6 /d. at 208-09.
7 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), states, in relevant part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . ." A
violation of this section requires an agreement between two or more entities. United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), TTWdified and q/f'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), states, in relevant part: "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States. . . ." See
irifra notes 433-36 and accompanying text.
s 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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reflected a judicial willingness to treat baseball as something other than a profit
oriented business. 9 The continuing validity of the Flood holding immunized
baseball from both the antitrust laws and a changing judicial perception of the
legal posture of sports which would fully blossom in the 1970'S.1O The treatment accorded sports during this period created a legal environment in which
team owners were to a large extent free to control unilaterally the sports industry and shape its destiny.
As the sports industry grew in wealth and national influence, however, the
Supreme Court became dissatisfied with the legal characterization of professional athletics embodied in baseball's antitrust immunity. The Court therefore refused to extend baseball's Sherman Act exemption to other professional
sports. l l The judicial system subsequently began subjecting non-baseball
sports to the full extent of the laws regulating economic ventures. In the
mid-1970's, a newly formed league in hockey 12 and nascent players unions in
both basketbalp3 and footbalP4 initiated lawsuits against the established
leagues which shattered prior relationships and created new legal and
economic environments for everyone associated with the sports industry .15
These cases held that a number ofleague practices, which had been used by the
owners to bind players to one team and to restrict open bidding on their services, were violations of the Sherman Act. 16 After these decisions, players
9 The Flood opinion begins with a tribute to baseball and its past stars. Id. at 260-64.
The Court also quotes, with seeming approval, the district court's statement that "The game is
on higher ground; it behooves every one to keep it there." !d. at 267. Finally, the decision affirms
baseball's federal antitrust immunity based on the Federal Baseball holding, but then denies the applicability of state antitrust statutes because baseball is interstate commerce. !d. at 284.
10 Baseball is the only sport where the players have obtained substantial monetary gain
without the benefit of direct judicial intervention. The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), through the collective bargaining process, gained the right to arbitrate contractual disputes between a player and his club. The union then procured an arbitration decision that
the standard baseball contract did not incorporate a perpetual reserve clause. Players were therefore free of any inter-club movement restrictions upon the expiration of the term of their individual contracts (including the one year option clause contained therein). Professional Baseball
Clubs, 66 LAB. ARB. & DISP. SETIL. 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.), aff'd sub nom. Kansas City Royals
Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo. 1976),
aff'd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
Because of its continuing antitrust immunity, baseball is not subject to the same legal
considerations as other professional sports. Baseball, therefore, is not one of the sports within the
central focus of this article. Although the labor law principles discussed herein would apply to
baseball, the antitrust concepts would be precluded by the sport's immunity.
11 See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional football); United States v. International Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (professional
boxing).
12 Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
13 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
14 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), "em. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977).
15 The baseball arbitration, discussed supra note 10, should also be considered part of
this legal revolution.
16 Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
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unions in each of the major professional sports were able to negotiate meaningful collective bargaining agreements with their respective leagues. These decisions and the agreements they engendered provided the impetus for the vastly
increased salaries and benefits players currently enjoy as compared to their
counterparts of a few years before. 17
The change in judicial attitude towards sports helped create a restructuring ofthe power relationships in the industry. The older perception, typified by
the ba~eball cases, rarely subjected the decisions of owners and the workings of
the leagues to serious judicial scrutiny or legal liability. The more recent
reasoning, delineated in the revolutionary cases of the 1970's, discarded league
rules and practices in the player restraint area as violations of federal antitrust
law. The courts in these cases used their "new" interpretation of sports' legal
status to provide struggling players unions with the economic power they were
unable to seize at the bargaining table. IS This balancing of power between
management and labor, combined with the ever-increasing source of revenue
available to owners through the broadcast industry, 19 has transformed professional sports into a mature commercial industry, an acknowledged national
business. As such, professional sports will experience all the legal problems inherent in. the distribution of wealth and power in any large-scale, profit-making
enterprise. In the legal climate created by the landmark decisions of the 1970's,
the future of the sports industry will be shaped by the joint action of owners and
players.
The uniqueness of both the sports business itself and its past treatment by
the courts indicates that special considerations exist which will shape the
guidelines for future legal activity relating to the industry. Many of the league
rules and structures in existence today were formed during the period when
sports enjoyed its old legal status, when it was not yet a true business in the
eyes of the law. The owners, at that time, did not have viable unions to
counter-balance their desires and believed that they were exempt from the
Sherman Act. 20 Management therefore unilaterally imposed a system which
served its own interests in ways which tended to restrain- trade. Although many

Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), dealt with hockey's reserve clause; Robertson v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), concerned basketball's reserve clause, uniform player
contract and collegiate draft; Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977), examined football's Rozelle Rule. For further discussion of
these cases, see infra notes 161-90 and 213-34 and accompanying text.
17 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 692. See also Kennedy & Williamson, Money: The
Monster Threatening Sports (pts. 1-3), SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,July 17,1978, at 29,July 24,1978, at
34 and July 31, 1978, at 34.
18 See J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, THE LAw OF SPORTS § 5.06, at 579-80 (1979)
[hereinafter cited asJ. WEISTART & C. LoWELL]; Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 744.
19 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
20 See Blecher and Daniels, Professional Sports and the "Single Entity" Defense Under Section
One of The Sherman Act, 4, WHITTIER L. REv. 217, 218 n.7 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Blecher
and Daniels]. The first Supreme Court cases to subject professional sports to the antitrust laws,
cited supra note 11, were decided as late as 1955 and 1957, respectively.
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of these practices have been modified by current collective bargaining agreements, an underlying management attitude and some unchallenged practices
remain unchanged. 21 In assessing the future legality of any sports rule, a factor
in the evaluation should be that the judicial system for years allowed and encouraged such an attitude by sports owners. This history, combined with the
business need for intraleague cooperation to produce an on-the-field product,
mandates that, in any context subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a finding of liability must be predicated on a full judicial inquiry. into the reasonableness of the practice and its effects and the history of its origin and implementation. 22 Such a result can be achieved in sports cases by avoiding a per se analysis and insisting on a mandatory rule of reason standard. 23
The sports industry also differs from conventional businesses in that it
contains a relatively small number of highly visible employees. Most industries
contain both a labor and a product market. The labor force is employed by
management to manufacture, sell or promote an article, the product, for purchase by a consumer. The purchaser has an interest in the thing bought, not in
observing the process whereby the item is made. In sports, the labor market is
the product market. Consumers do not purchase a thing, but they pay to watch
the employees work. 24 Restraints imposed by management on the labor force
therefore are also restraints imposed on the product market. 25 To a certain extent, this identity of markets merges the labor and antitrust interests relevant to

21 See, e.g., National Basketball Players Association Agreement, article XXII (collegiate
draft and free agent compensation system) (1980-1982); Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National Football League Management Council and the NFLPA, Article XIII (collegiate draft) and Article XV (free agent compensation) (1977-1982) (both contracts available at
Boston College Law School Library).
22 In imposing antitrust liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act, supra note 7, the statute
seems to condemn all agreements in restraint of trade. In Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Supreme Court ruled that only unreasonable restraints are proscribed by the statute. Courts were therefore required to conduct a lengthy analysis, pursuant to
this rule of reason logic, to determine if the challenged practice unreasonably restrained trade in
its particular business context. As antitrust law deVeloped, however, certain practices were found
to be inherently unreasonable and, therefore, an exhaustive inquiry on their reasonableness was
no longer required. Typical examples of such categories of per se liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act are: price-fIXing, division of market's tying arrangements and concerted refusals to
deal. See SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST §§ 63-72 (1977); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F.
Supp. 867, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
23 This approach has been adopted by both circuit courts which have decided the issue,
each reversing a district court opinion imposing liability on a per se basis. Mackey v. National
Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), qff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See Comment, Application of the Labor Exemption After the Expiration of Collective Bargaining Agreements In Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 164, 166 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, N.Y.U. L. REV.].
2i Roberts and Powers, Defining the Relationship between Antitrust Law and Labor Law: Professional Sports and the Current Legal Battleground, 19 WM. & MARy L. REv. 395, 460 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Roberts and Powers]; Comment, The Battle ofthe Superstars:.Player Restraints in
Professional Team Sports, 32 FLA. L. REv. 669, 699 (1980).
25 Roberts and Powers, supra note 24, at 462.

346

BOSTON COLLEGE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24:341

professional sports and mandates a special balancing in applying the rules of
either area of law and in determining the proper interaction between them.
High visibility employees introduce an additional disparity to any traditionallegal analysis. In sports, as in other facets of the entertainment business,
tradition dictates that each player individually negotiates his yearly salary and
signs an individual employment contract with his respective team. 26 Players
unions are thus distinguished from conventional labor unions in that sports
associations collectively bargain for benefits and control of working and contractual provisions, but, through a waiver in the collective bargaining agreement, allow for salaries to be individually negotiated. 27 In the historic sports
setting, owners therefore face dual levels of negotiations: collective dealings
with the union every three to five years to produce a collective bargaining
agreement, and yearly talks with rookies and some unsigned veterans to establish their individual salaries. Federal labor law principles would appear to control both types of negotiations. 28
Although the above considerations are essential to a general understanding of the special legal problems facing the sports industry in the future, the
resolution of any particular issue will depend on the nature of the parties to the
litigation. The relative importance of labor and antitrust principles will change
depending on the identity of the party challenging the legality of a certain procedure. Future litigation in sports is therefore best analyzed by concentrating
on the competing interests of different members of the industry and focusing on
the resolution of is'sues in the context of specified parties.

26 See, e.g., the National Basketball Association's Uniform Player Contract and the National Football League's Player Contract (available in Boston College Law School Library).
27 See, e.g., Basic Agreement between the American and National Leagues of Baseball
Clubs and the MLBPA, Art. Y (1980-1983). The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
NF:L and the'NFLPA, whi~expiredJuly 15,1982, contained a similar waiver in Art. XXII, §.§
8 and 9 (references available at 'Boston College Law School Library). In bargaining on a new
agreement, the NFLPA attempted to eliminate individual negotiations and implement a league
wide wage scale based on a percentage of the league's gross income. NFLPA PAMPHLET, supra
note 2, at 48-50. The institution of-such a scale, based on seniority, would be unique in professional sports. In order to obtain that gc;>al, the union refused to allow clubs to negotiate with individual players after the July 15, 1982, deadline. See Stellino, Top Draft Picks, Agents Feel Trapped,
THE SPORTING NEWS, July 26, 1982, at 50, col. 1. The NFLPA, however, in exchange for increased fringe benefits, settled for an agreement which continued the former system of individual
bargaining over salaries. See Stellino, Major Points in New Agreement, THE SPORTING NEWS,
November 29, 1982, at 41, col. 1. See also infra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
28 See irifra notes 335-58 and accompanying text. Although these principles generally apply to all professional sports, some other considerations regarding specific sports remain. As explained more fully supra at note 10, antitrust principles are still inapplicable to baseball. In addition, the likelihood for future legal confrontation seems greatest in professional football. Since its
revenue is, to a greater extent than other sports, associated with television, its potential revenue
growth is the greatest of the sports industry. In addition, football players feel increasingly underpaid in comparison to their baseball, basketball and hockey counterparts. See Berry and Gould,
supra note 1, at 704 n.41. The NFLPA is also more controversial in the positions its advocates and
the results it has produced. See NFLPA PAMPHLET, supra note 2; Roberts and Powers, supra note
24, at 465-66; Ray, Players Ask: Was Long Walkout Worth It?, THE SPORTING NEWS, November
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The future relationship between sports and the judicial system, therefore,
will center on the application of the traditional business principles of antitrust
and labor law to the newly balanced sports industry. 29 This article will examine
these interests in four different contexts:
1. Labor-Management. Future legal disputes between unions/
players and league/owners will involve antitrust law, labor law
and the interaction of these two legal systems. As the sports industry matures, disagreement between these parties should increasingly be resolved by labor law principles. The current test, however, for deciding when labor law precepts preclude the application of the antitrust statutes appears to interpret incorrecdy Supreme Court precedent and gives improper weight to the balancing oflegal interests required in the sports context. The resolution
of future conflicts requires a different standard which fully incorporates the pro-union origin of the labor law exemption. 30
2. Labor-Labor. The players' unions have only recendy acquired
real strength within the industry. This new power is accompanied
by increased responsiOility to union members. The union's duty
of fair representation and its regulation of players' agents are scrutinized in this section of the article. 31
3. Management-Management. The article proposes the appropriate
application of antitrust and labor law principles as new leagues
and dissatisfied owners sue the established leagues for a different
distribution of the industry's wealth. 32
4. Government-Industry. The article finally considers consumer
interest in the industry and explores the efforts of the non-judicial
branches of government to regulate professional sports, particularly in the areas of franchise movement and player agents' qualifications.33
The changes wrought in professional sports mandate a normalization of the

29, 1982, at 41, cols. 1-3. Finally, the issues presented and the scope of this article are generally
limited to team sports rather than individual sports such as golf, tennis and boxing.
29 In addition to these topics, other substantive areas will be implicated in future legal
problems of sports. For example, contract principles regarding the interpretation of individual
clauses in a player's yearly agreement or of a collective bargaining agreement may be relevant.
Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 712. Federal income tax also has significant impact upon the
fmancial interests of individual owners and players. See Lowell, Planning Contractual Deferred CompensationArrangementsfor Professional Athletes, 10 TAX ADVISER 68 (Feb. 1979); Ambrose, Recent Tax
Developments Regarding Purchases of Sports Franchises - The Game Isn't Over Yet, 59 TAXES 739 (Nov.
1981). Antitrust and labor law, however, appear to be the major disciplines which will shape the
future of the sports industry as a whole. The scope of this article is consequently focused primarilyon those two areas.
30 See irifra notes 34-358 and accompanying text.
S! See irifra notes 359-408 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 409-34 and accompanying text.
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legal treatment given to the industry. The proper application of antitrust and
labor law principles, ~erefore, will merely constitute a recognition by courts
and legislatures of the true business character of the professional sports industry in America.

r.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT

Labor and management have been the most frequent participants in past
sports/litigation. 34 The judicial system, through its decisions in the cases of the
1970's, eliminated the harshest aspects of sports' player restraint system and
established a union-league equilibrium somewhat akin to the labor-management balance in non-sports industries of a similar national stature. 35 Antitrust
concepts were the principal tools employed by the courts to achieve this
parity.36 As the player-owner balance stabilizes, the continuing role, if any, of
antitrust law must be defmed and the increasing importance of labor law
policies emphasized.
A. The Proper Role oj the Labor Law Exemption from Antitrust Liability
The threshold question regarding the future function of antitrust law is the
propriety of applying the Sherman Act's antitrust principles in the sports context at all. As labor unions mature and collectively create bargaining agreements with management, the proper initial inquiry is into the nature and scope
of the judicially created labor exemption from antitrust liability for practices
embodied in such agreements.

1. The Exemption as Defmed in Non-Sports Precedent
The relationship between antitrust and labor law began in the early
Twentieth Century. Federal courts at that time used the Sherman Act to limit
severely the formation and growth of American labor unions. 37 Toward this
end, antitrust law served as a tool to frustrate nascent labor law principles and
to preserve the imbalance which then existed between management and
labor.38 To eliminate such use of antitrust law and to allow labor unions to
achieve economic parity with management, Congress passed the Clayton
Act. 39 The Clayton Act provided, in relevant part, that labor unions are not ilSee infra notes 435-60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v.
National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73
(N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management,
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
35 See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
36 See irifra notes 161-250 and accompanying text.
37 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208
U.S. 274 (1908).
38 &e R. GoRMAN, LABOR LAw, ch. 1, at 1-4 (1976).
39 Clayton Act of 1914 SS 1-26, 15 U.S.C. SS 12-27 (1976).
3S

3i
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legal combinations in restraint of trade under the antitrust laws and that
federal courts are limited in their injunctive powers in the labor area. 40 Subsequently, the Norris-LaGuardia Act41 further restricted the equity jurisdiction
of federal courts in matters involving a "labor dispute. "42 These provisions
constitute the statutory exemption from antitrust liability granted to labor
unions by Congress. In two early cases applying this statutory exemption, Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader43 and United States v. Hutcheson,44 the Supreme Court expanded the applicability of this legislative grant.
Apex Hosiery involved a sit-down strike conducted against the company for
the purpose of organizing its workers.45 The corporation sued the union under
the Sherman Act for damages to its business and property during the strike. ,
The Court denied the factory's claim for antitrust damages. 46 The Court
justified its conclusion by holding that the strike was not a restraint directed at
the product market of Apex's business and therefore did not produce effects
which the Sherman Act proscribed. 47 The union was not being used by other
combinations as the means of fixing the price of hosiery. 48 The Sherman Act,
by its nature, was therefore not intended to be used against a union for practices which primarily influenced the labor market. The statutory exemption
further evidenced Congressional intent that the antitrust laws, by design, were
not applicable in this context. 49
Hutcheson involved a criminal charge of Sherman Act violation against a
carpenters' union and its officials. 50 The indictment was based on nationwide
picketing and boycotting performed by the labor group against AnheuserBusch and its products. 51 The union's actions resulted from a jurisdictional
dispute between it and a machinists' union performing work for Busch. 52 The
Hutcheson Court focused on the exempt nature of the labor activities conducted
by the defendants. 53 The Court declared that the statutory exemption im-

Clayton Act of 1914 § 6, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17, 20; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 §§ 1-15, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
42 Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 §§ 4, 5 and 13, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 and 113'
(1976). For a review of the history of these provisions, see Comment, N.Y. U. L. REv., supra note
23, at 172 n.23.
43 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
H 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
45 Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1940).
46 Id. at 503.
47 !d. at 501, 512.
48 Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 602 F.2d494, 514 (3d
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), reh'g, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1981).
49 See Handler and Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of
the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 459,479-81 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Handler and Zifchak].
50 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1941).
51 Id.
52Id.
53 !d. at 231-37.
40
41
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munizes union activity from Sherman Act sanction if "a union acts in its selfinterest and does not combine with non-labor groups . . . . "5~ The Court
deemed immaterial the fact that the underlying controversy was with another
union, rather than the product of an employer-employee dispute. 55 The Court,
therefore, interpreted the statutory exemption to preclude Sherman Act liability for unilateral labor activity, even when those actions produced effects in the
product market. 56
These two cases and the statutes they interpret represent the core of the
labor exemption from the antitrust laws. Apex Hosiery and Hutcheson provide two
different rationales, both supported by the legislative immunity, for the insula:
tion of independent union activity: (1) if the union's actions have negligible
product market effects, the restraints are not within the ambit of Sherman Act
proscription, 57 and (2) if the union activity at issue has significant product
market effects, labor principles mandate that a direct exemption from antitrust
liability be granted. 58 The exemption was formulated to protect legitimate
union activity and the economic weapons which labor law allows a labor force
to employ in its bargaining with management - strikes, picketing and boycottS. 59 The statutory exemption (as interpreted in these two cases) therefore
precludes antitrust liability for unilateral union conduct. The immunity
described in Apex Hosiery and Hutcheson, however, did not include within its
scope the provisions of collective bargaining agreements negotiated by unions
with management. 60
The Supreme Court's first decision delineating the expansion of this
unilateral statutory exemption to include joint management-labor agreements
was Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 13, IBEW.61 The defendant union in
Allen Bradley had entered into collective bargaining agreements with electrical
equipment manufacturers and contractors in the New York City area. 62 These
agreements contained closed-shop provisions which obligated contractors to
purchase equipment only from manufacturers employing union members and
also obligated manufacturers to sell equipment only to contractors using union
employees. 63 The contractual terms precluded the plaintiff manufacturer from

ld. at 232.
!d.
56 For an assertion that the proscription of combination with non-labor groups means
that Hutcheson protects more than unilateral union activity, see Handler and Zifchak, supra note
49, at 478.
57 Apex Hoisery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 485-515 (1940).
58 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-37 (1941). See Handler and Zifchak,
supra note 49, at 481.
59 See Roberts and Powers, supra note 24, at 431.
60 !d. See also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965).
61 325 U.S. 797 (1945). The movement from protection of unilateral union activity
marks the beginning of the non-statutory labor law exemption.
62 ld. at 799-800.
63 ld. at 799.
5i
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sell4J.g his electrical equipment in the area64 and enabled a union-manufacturer-contractor committee to fIx prices and control the lucrative New York
City market. 65 As the price of electrical equipment rose, the participating companies achieved increased profIts and the union obtained higher wages and
shorter hours for its members.66 Writing for the Court, Justice Black noted that
the case required a balancing of the Congressional policy of preserving a competitive business economy with the equally important goal of preserving the
right oflabor to organize and gain better conditions through collective bargaining. 67 Conducting the required balancing, Justice Black indicated that a collective bargaining agreement provision for a closed shop, if standing alone, would
be entitled to an exemption from the Sherman Act. 68 The agreement in the case
at bar did not stand alone, however, but was merely one element in a much
larger management-union conspiracy to monopolize the N ew York City electrical equipment market. 69 Justice .Black concluded that the union forfeited its
exemption not because it entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a
non-labor group, but because it participated in management activities which,
in total, the Court could characterize as a conspiracy to monopolize. 70
Thus, the Allen Bradley Court did not extend to the bilateral collective bargaining process the same absolute exemption previously granted unilateral
union activity. The Court did not hold that every provision obtained from an
employer as a result of good faith bargaining was exempt from the antitrust
laws. 71 The non-statutory exemption was instead founded upon a weighing of
6f Id. The plaintiff was a non-New York City company. Id. The local therefore was
jurisdictionally precluded by its union from entering into a collective bargaining agreement with
the plaintiff. Id.
6~ Id. at 800.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 806. As stated by Theodore St. Antoine, "The antitrust laws are designed to
promote competition, and unions, avowedly and unabashedly, are designed to limit it. According to classical trade union theory, the objective is the elimination of wage competition among all
employees doing the same job in the same industry. " St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense oj Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REv. 603, 604 (1976) [hereinafter cited as St. Antoine].
68 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 13, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797,809 (1945).
69 Id. The Court also noted:
But when the unions participated with a combination of business men who had complete power to eliminate all competition among themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a situation was created not included within the exemptions of
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts .... fmdingno purpose of Congress to immunize labor unions who aid and abet manufacturers and traders in violating the
Sherman Act, we hold that the district court correcdy concluded that the
respondents had violated the act.
Id. at 809, 810.
70 Id. at 811. The Court stated: "We know that Congress feared the concentrated
power of business organizations to dominate markets and prices. It intended to oudaw business
monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such participation is a violation of the Act." Id.
71 Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 602 F.2d 494,514 (3d
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), reh'g, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1981).
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the competing policies of antitrust and labor law. In the process of striking such
a balance, a union is liable for Sherman Act damages if it participates in a
management conspiracy to monopolize. This liability attaches even if the product market restraint produces benefits for the labor force. 72 While unilateral
union activity affecting a product market is therefore protected from Sherman
Act sanction pursuant to Hutcheson, management-labor agreements which
restrain a product market will not be included within the non-statutory exemption if, as will normally be the case, the agreement can be characterized as an
Allen Bradley conspiracy. Allen Bradley, however, did clarify the expansion of the
labor law exemption by indicating that some collective bargaining agreements,
if not part of such a conspiracy, would be immune from the purview of the antitrust statutes. 73
The Supreme Court's next explanation of the exemption's meaning occurred in the companion cases of UMW v. Pennington74 and Local Union No. 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea CO.75 In both cases the Court split into
three groups of three justices each, with separate opinions by Justices White,
Douglas and Goldberg. 76 Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court in Pennington,77 as his reasoning was joined by the Douglas group.78 The White and
Goldberg groups could only agree on the judgment inJewel Tea and, as such,
there was no opinion of the Court. The fractionated nature of these opinions

72 Justice Goldberg later summarized the core of Allen Bradlf:}"s holding as follows:
Thus Allen Bradlf:}' involved two elements (1) union participation in price fIxing and
market allocation, with the only union interest being the indirect prospect that these
anticompetitive devices might increase employers' profIts which might then triclcle
down to the employees, (2) accomplished by the union's joining a combination or
conspiracy of the employers.
Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 707 (1965).
73 See Casey and Cozzillio, Labor-Antitrust: The Problems oj Connell and a Remedy That
Dollows Naturally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235, 242. The state of the exemption following these three
cases has been described as follows:
Together this trilogy of hallmark opinions teaches that the availability of the labor
exemption turns on the answers to three questions: First, is the challenged conduct
exempt under Norris-LaGuardia from the issuance of a labor injuction? Second,
does the conduct substantially affect market competition? Third, is it unilaterally
motivated? Thus, if union conduct is embraced by the permissive provisions of
Norris-LaGuardia, or if it does not have the effect of restraining commercial competition (as opposed to competition based on differences in labor standards), and ifit
is pursued by the union solely in its own self-interest, it is exempt from antitrust
liability. Conversely, if the challenged conduct is outside the protective ambit of
N orris-LaGuardia, and if it direcdy affects market competition, or if it is the product of conspiracy with employer groups, then it is subject to the antitrust laws.
Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 482-83.
H 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
75 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
76 Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan. Justice
Douglas was joined by Justices Black and Clark. Justice Goldberg was joined by Justices Harlan
and Stewart.
77 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659-72 (1965).
78 /d. at 672-75.

March 1983]

MATURING SPORTS INDUSTRY

353

has served to confuse rather than clarify the true nature of the exemption in the
collective bargaining context. 79
The labor exemption in Pennington arose from a cross-claim filed by Phillips Brothers Coal Company against the union for violation of the Sherman
Act. 80 The claim alleged that the union had conspired with large coal companies to solve the problem of overproduction in the coal industry by eliminating small producers. 81 The unions agreed to accept mechanization of the mines
and to impose the wage and benefit terms of a prior agreement with the large
companies on all operators regardless of their ability to pay. 82 The union in return received increased wages, greater royalty payments for its welfare fund
and production and marketing restrictions on the sale of nonunion coal. 83 The
larger companies then waged a price cutting campaign against small operators
and engaged in other activities, allegedly with union assistance, to drive
smaller companies, now tied to higher wages and costs, out of business. 84 J ustice White's opinion in Pennington noted that price-fixing in the product market,
even at union behest, or collusive bidding in the coal market, even with union
participation, would clearly not be immune from the antitrust laws merely
because of union involvement. 85
The White opinion then focused on whether the union's agreement with
the large operator,s to impose the wage and royalty scales found in their bargaining agreement upon smaller coal operators qualified for the exemption. 86
Wages lie at the core of management-labor relations and are of essential interest to the union and the labor force. Management-labor confrontation over
wages is also a mandatory subject of collective bargaining dictated by the National Labor Relations Act. 87 Recognizing the importance of labor considerations regarding the subject of wages, White nqted that it was "beyond question" that a union, as a matter of its own policy and not in agreement with any
employer, could determine an appropriate wage scale with qne set of employers
and seek that scale from all other employers with which it dealt. 88 Such activity
would be immune from antitrust liability.
White then explained, however, that this statement did not imply that all
management-labor agreements were automatically entitled to immunity if they
Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 483.
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659 (1965).
81 !d.
82 Id. at 660.
8S Id.
8f !d. at 661.
85 !d. at 662-63.
86 Id. at 664-69.
87 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NLRA]. Section 8(d) of the NLRA
requires "the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment .••. " Id. § 158(d). Failure to bargain in good faith on these mandatory subjects is an unfair labor practice for management, id. § 158(a)(5), and labor. Id. § 158(b)(3).
88 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965).
79

80
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related to mandatory subjects of bargaining. 89 According to White, the union's
conduct at issue - agreement "with one set of employers to impose a certain
wage scale on other bargaining units" 90 - exceeded the limits of protected activity. The immunity would not apply because the union participated in the
employers' competitive interest in the activities of non-unit employers. 91 This
standard appears to entail union complicity in a predatory intent to harm the
employer's business competitors. 92 A separate reason for not granting the immunity was the uniQn's decision to forfeit its bargaining freedom with other
units. 93 White concluded that such an abnegation of discretion was, by itself, a
restraint suitable for proscription by the antitrust laws. 94

89 !d. .at 664-65. The Court stated:
This is not to say that an agreement resulting from union-employer negotiations
is automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny simply because the negotiations
involve a compulsory subject of bargaining, regardless of the subject or the form and
content of the agreement. Unquestionably, the Board's demarcation of the bounds
of the duty to bargain has great relevance to any consideration of the sweep of
labor's antitrust immunity.... But there are limits to what a union or an employer
may offer or extract in the name of wages, and because they must bargain does not
mean that the agreement reached may disregard other laws.
!d. This conclusion directly conflicts with the position ofJustice Goldberg. See infra notes 111-16
and accompanying text.
90 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965). An important and
initial labor law determination is the delineation of an appropriate bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. §
159(a) (1976). The unit is composed of a certain group of jobs and, therefore, employees.
Workers vote, on a majority of the unit basis, to elect their exclusive representative. That
representative, typically a union, then bargains with management on behalf of the unit. See R.
GoRMAN, LABOR LAw, ch. 5, § 1, at 66 (1976). In the sports industry, each league as a whole
(the Major League for baseball) has been treated as the appropriate unit. This has been generally
true of sports despite the existence of strong arguments that each club should be its own unit. See
Berry and Gould, supra note 1, 796-98. Players unions therefore are elected and negotiate leaguewide. This unit size may partially explain the pro-management power tilt in the early years of
bargaining discussed irifra at note 9 and accompanying text.
91 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965). The Court
stated:
One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from the industry and the union is liable with the employers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy. This is true even though the union's pact in the scheme is an undertaking to
secure the same wages, hours or other conditions of employment from the remaining employers in the industry.
[d.
92 Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 602 F.2d 494,515 (3d
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), reh'g, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1981).
93 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965). The Court stated:
From the viewpoint of antitrust policy, moreover, all such agreements between a
group of employers and a union that the union will seek specified labor standards
outside the bargaining unit suffer from a more basic defect, without regard to
predatory intention 01' effect in the particular case. For the salient characteristic of
such agreements is that the union surrenders its freedom of action with respect to its
bargaining policy.
!d.
94 !d. at 669.
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Jewel Tea involved a collective bargaining agreement between a butchers'
union and food stores selling meat. 95 The agreement, which expired in 1957,
contained a provision 'which forbade the sale of meat before 9 a.m. and after 6
p.m. in both service and self-service markets."96 The stores, in the negotiations for a new agreement, tried to entice the union to relax this marketing
hours restriction, but the union rejected all proposals increasing the hours during which meat could be sold. 97 After long bargaining sessions, all but Jewel
and another store agreed to continue the same marketing restrictions. 98 Jewel,
wishing to expand its self-service meat counter into nighdy hours, refused to
accede and the union membership authorized a strike against it. 99 Responding
to the pressure of the labor stoppage threat, Jewel reserved its rights, signed the
agreement and then initiated a,ction against the union claiming that the
marketing hours restriction violated the Sherman Act. loO
Justice White began his analysis of the immunity's applicability inJewel
Tea by noting that the complaint did not .allege a union-employer conspiracy
against Jewel. 101 White also noted preliminarily that immunity was not required to be applied simply because the parties to the agreement an~ the
lawsuit were an employer and the unions representing his employees; the
Court was still required to balance antitrust and labor law policies. l02 White
concluded that the required weighing of policies indicated that the union's activities did fall within the exemption.

Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours restriction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to
wages, hours and working conditions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain. that provision through bona fide, arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the
behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the
protections of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from
the Sherman Act. We think that it is.103
White's opinion then noted that the marketing hours restrictions were mandatory subjects of bargaining within the direct and immediate concern of the
interests of the union's members.104, The opinion impliedly defined the phrase
95 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
679-80 (1965).
96 Id. at 680.
97 !d. at 681.
98 Id.
99 !d.
100 Id.
.
101 Id. at 688. This statement implies that the fact pattern is distinguishable from the
allegations in Pennington.
102 Id. at 689.
103 !d. at 689-90.
m !d. at 691. Justice White perceived that even the opening of self-service counters had
an impact on the job security and working hours of the butchers. The restriction at issue was
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"not at the behest of . . . nonlabor groups: by detailing the union's longstanding concern with marketing hours and the history of its bargaining efforts
to reduce the hours of operation. White thereby indicated that the resistance to
longer hours was part of the union's own policy. 105
Justice Douglas' opinions in both Pennington and Jewel Tea relied on the
participation in a conspiracy analysis contained in Allen Bradley .106 Pursuant to
the dictates of that reasoning, the union was not entitled to an exemption in
either case. The UMW in Pennington had combined in a classic Allen Bradley
conspiracy to impose terms on third parties. l07 Such activity was beyond the
exemption and subjected the union to potential antitrust liability. The Jewel
Tea collective bargaining agreement was evidence of a conspiracy between the
butchers union and the other stores to impose marketing hour restrictions on
J ewel. l08 Douglas concluded, therefore, that since the employers could not
unilaterally impose such a limitation without violating antitrust precepts, the
union's participation in the restraint could not insulate prohibited conduct. 109
Justice Goldberg's opinion, dissenting from the opinion but concurring in
the reversal in Pennington and concurring in the judgment in Jewel Tea, is
predicated on the assumption that judicial and legislative history indicates that
Congress did not want courts to interfere in the collective bargaining process
through the imposition of antitrust liability on either management or labor. 110
Abuses by either party within the bargaining process should be regulated
according to the provisions of the federal labor statutes. 111 That premise led
Goldberg to conclude that "collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Lapor Act is not subject to the antitrust
laws. "U2 Goldberg perceived an inherent inconsistency in requiring labor and
management to bargain over certain topics and then penalizing them for
reaching an agreement on those same issues. 113 Goldberg also interpreted
White'sJewel Tea opinion as distinguishing between types of mandatory subjects depending on their importance to the labor force. u4 This reasoning allowed the judicial system to review the substantive concessions of the bargaining process, a result contrary to labor policy. us The opinion finally noted that
therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining under § 9(a) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
White implies that, within the group of mandatory subjects, some mandatory subjects are more
important to labor because of their direct and immediate concern to employees. /d.
105 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
696-97 (1965).
106 [d. at 735-38; United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 673-75 (1965).
107 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 673-74 (1965).
108 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
736 (1965).
109 [d. at 736-37.
110 /d. at 709.
111 [d.
112 [d. at 710.
113 /d. at 712.
m [d. at 727.
115 /d. at 716-19.
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the distinction between unilateral union activity and a management-labor conspiracy was ineffectual in analyzing a collective bargaining agreement. According to Goldberg, unilateral union activity will not produce agreement and
mandatory bargaining will always require joint action. U6
The interaction of the three positions inJewel Tea and Pennington elucidate
some of the exemption's parameters in the collective bargaining context. The
reasoning in Allen Bradley that provisions of collective bargaining agreements
were not automatically entided to the exemption was reaffirmed. This position
is implicit in the majority's rejection of Justice Goldberg's plea for an
automatic immunity for negotiation and agreement regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining. The process of balancing antitrust and labor law interests
in each specific case precludes any per se rule of immunity. 117 The Court was
explicit in its holding that the obligation to bargain imposed on the parties by
federal labor law does not necessarily include the freedom to disregard other
laws.ll8 Pennington also reinforces the Allen Bradley notion of conspiracy. In denying the application of the exemption, the Court intimated that a union which
adopted the competitive interests of management participated in an Allen
Bradley conspiracy. A union forfeits its immunity when it asserts those interests
outside of its unit, regardless of whether the assertion takes the form of active
pressure or passive restriction of bargaining freedom.u9
Jewel Tea contains a number of insights to the exemption particularly relevant for the sports industry. Unlike the other cases, Jewel Tea presented one
party to a collective bargaining agreement suing another party to the same
agreement for antitrust violations. 120 The Court implied that suits brought by
either management or labor in that position would not be automatically entided to the exemption. 121 Jewel Tea also involved a restraint which affected both
the labor and product markets. 122 The Court decided that such provisions are
exempt when they are found to be "intimately related" to both mandatory
subjects of bargaining and important interests of the union and its
membership.123 This position seems to include a judicial evaluation of which
mandatory subjects are at the heart of labor's interest. The rejection of a required exemption for all mandatory subjects of bargaining implies that there
are some mandatory subjects which are less important to labor than others for
purposes .of the exemption analysis. 124 Apparendy, only mandatory subjects

116

117

Id. at 721.
See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622

(1975).

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
120 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
680-81 (1965).
121 See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
122 See St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 615.
123 /d. at 621; see also supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
I2f See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
liB

119
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which are also important to a union will qualify for the exemption. A union's
prior positions, as indicated by the parties' bargaining history, provides an indication of the importance of a particular provision to the union. Finally,
agreements which reflect management's competitive interests will not qualify
for the exemption. 125 The Jewel Tea opinion, in the course of granting the
exemption, described in detail the history of the union's unilateral effort to
restrict marketing hours on the sale of meat. 126 The exemption applies to provisions initiated by labor and advanced by a union pursuing the heart of its
members' interests, "not at the behest of any employer group. "127 The exemption as applied to collective bargaining agreements was therefore interpreted in
a manner consistent with the basis of the statutory exemption delineated ih
Apex Hosiery and Hutcheson - protection of unilateral labor interests. 128
The Supreme Court most recently dealt with the exemption in Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100. 129 Connell did not directly
involve a restraint in a collective bargaining agreement, but concerned an
agreement between a union and a general contractor that the latter would only
subcontract mechanical work to firms which were parties to the union's current
collective bargaining agreement. 130 The union had no interest in organizing or
representing employees of the general contractor .131 The contractor signed the
subcontracting agreement only after picketing and a work stoppage at one of its
construction sites. 132
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
127 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
688 (1965). See also supra note 103 and acompanying text; HandIer and Zifchak, supra note 49, at
484-85; apdJ. WEINSTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 18, at 330.
128 The appropriate test after Pennington andJewel Tea has been formulated as follows:
SynthesizingJustice White's opinion in Penningwn andJewel Tea, it is aparent that
a collectively bargained agreement will enjoy antitrust immunity only ifjirst, the circumstances of its negotiation are such that it can be said that the union acted
unilaterally, that is, it pursued the agreement in its own self-interest, rather than
"at the behest of or in combination with non-labor groups"; seco~ the subject of
the agreement is "intimately related" to matters of "immediate and direct" union
concern - conditions of employment - and not matters, such as prices, that at best
are of only indirect concern and serve to restrain the product market in "direct and
immediate" fashion; and third, the agreement does not impair the freedom of contract of the parties to the collective bargaming agreement in their relations with third
parties.
HandIer and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 485.
129 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
130 /d. at 618-19.
131 /d. at 619.
132 [d. at 620. The underlying collective bargaining agreements between the union and
an association of subcontractors contained a "most favored nation" clause. Id. at 619. Pursuant
to that provision, the union agreed that, if it extended mor,e.favorable terms to any subcontractor
it would subsequently organize, it would offer those same terms to association members. /d. The
union therefore agreed that it would not give a non-association subcontractor an advantage over
association members. The association thereby benefitted from the union's future organizational
efforts and was sheltered from outside competition in the market covered by agreements of the
Connell variety. Id. at 623-24. This "most favored nation" clause was not, however, relied on by
125

126
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Justice Powell, writing for the Court, began by noting that, although the
statutory exemption did not apply to concerted action or agreements between
management and labor, the Court had created a "limited nonstatutory exemption" for some such agreements based on the "proper accommodation" between the competing policies favoring collective bargaining and free competition in business markets. ISS The majority then reaffirmed the nature of the
exemption.
The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor
policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition
over wages and working conditions. Union success in organizing
workers and standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers, but the goals of federal labor law never could
be achieved if this effect on business competition were held a violation
of the antitrust laws. The Court therefore acknowledged that labor
policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition
based on differences in wages and working conditions. 1s4
The Court, however, in applying the "proper accommodation" test in Connell,
concluded that the agreement at bar forfeited any claim of antitrust immunity
because it restrained the business market to an extent not justified by the
elimination of wage and working condition competition. 1S5
The Connell Court therefore held that a product market restraint which
will qualify for the exemption must flow from the basic labor activity which a
Connell to assert a union-unionized subcontractor conspiracy. Connell simply used it as a factor
indicating the restraint implicit in its agreement with the union. !d. at 625 n.2.
133 Id. at 622.
mId.
13S !d. at 625-26.
This record contains no evidence that the union's goal was anything other than
organizing as many subcontractors as possible. This goal was legal, even though a
successful organizing campaign ultimately would reduce the competition that
unionized employers face from non-union frrms. But the methods the unions chose
are not immune from antitrust sanctions simply because the goal is legal. Here
Local 100, by agreement with several contractors, made nonunion subcontractors
ineligible to compete for a portion of the available work. This kind of direct restraint
on the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and
potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over
wages and working conditions. It contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not
justified by congressional labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory
exemption from the antitrust laws.
There can be no argument in this case, whatever its force in other contexts, that a
restraint of this magnitude might be entided to an antitrust exemption if it were included in a lawful collective-bargaining agreement.
[d. Powell also concluded that the agreement was not allowed by the construction-industry proviso of § 8(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), because it was not in the context ofa collective bargaining relationship and it was not limited to a particular jobsite. Connell Constr. Co.
v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. at 626. Although the agreement was therefore
found to be an unfair labor practice, the Court concluded that the remedies of the NLRA were
not exclusive and exposure to potential antitrust liability was appropriate. [d. at 634-35. For a
criticism of this aspect of the decision, see Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 486-87.
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union conducts - the elimination of competition among employees regarding
their salaries and employment conditions. In addition, the restraint must be no
broader than needed to accomplish that goal. 136 Connell has been interpreted as
limiting the availability of the exemption and requiring a narrower interpretation of wages and working conditions in the exemption, as opposed to the bargaining, context.137 This reading of Connell has been strengthened by a subsequent Supreme Court statement that all antitrust exemptions are to be narrowly construed. 13B The denial of exemption in Connell is particularly significant
since the agreement was initiated by the union and appeared to be only at the
union's behest. 139 The agreement was therefore arguably analogous to the unilateral union activity protected by Hutcheson's interpretation of the statutory exemption. 140 According to the Connell Court, however, the joint agreement's
restraint on the product market was too extensive to be justified by relevant
labor considerations. 141 Connell therefore suggests that antitrust interests - the
extent of product market restraint - must be given increased emphasis in the
balancing process. Connell also implies that a union's own evaluation of what is
a proper or important labor interest is open to judicial scrutiny in the immunity
analysis. The labor interest seems likely to prevail when the agreement is
direcdy related to union proposals regarding wages, working hours or job
preservation - traditionally important employee concerns - and the restraint
on the product market is not excessive.142 The possibility of exemption also appears to increase when the union initiates the restraint and persuades a nonwilling employer to agree to it.143 Connell's denial of exemption to a labor initiated proposal casts severe doubt upon the availability of the exemption for
136 See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 602 F.2d 494,
517-18 (3dCir. 1979) vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), reh'g. 641 F.2d 90
(3d Cir. 1981); Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Building and Constr. Trades Council,
609 F.2d 1368, 1373 (3d Cir. 1979); Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union of
America, 553 F.2d 793, 801 (2d Cir. 1977).
137 St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 630; Roberts and Powers, supra note 24, at 454.
138 Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S 205, 231 (1979).
139 See Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 486.
HO !d. at 492-93.
HI Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,421 U.S. 616,
624 (1975). The Court noted that the agreement at issue, in combination, gave the union control
over the mechanical subcontracting market. Id. Contravailing labor law interest was lessened
since the union had no desire to organize collectively Connell's own employers. !d. at 626.
H2 See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676,695-97 (1965). See also Suburban Beverages, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1301,
1307-10 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
H3 See, e.g., Intercontineptal Container Transport Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n,
Inc., 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970). The court stated:
Thus it appears that, far from aiding and abetting a violation of the Sherman Act by
a group of business men, the union here, acting solely in its own self-interest, forced
reluctant employers to yield to certain of its demands. Under these circumstances
the resulting agreement is within the protection of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., supra.
Id. at 888.
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restraints conceived by management. Connell in this sense reinforces the Pennington holding that a union could not adopt the "competitive interests" of
management. Immunity will not be granted if the union's activity can be
characterized as evincing an intent to aid management in dominating its product market. 1H
While focusing on the substantive scope of the exemption, the Supreme
Court cases do not address whether a management defendant can derivatively
assert the non-statutory exemption in an appropriate lawsuit. 145 The Goldberg
opinion in Jewel Tea, in the course of arguing for an exemption for all mandatory bargaining, noted the unfairness of penalizing an employer for complying with a required duty to bargain. 146 Aside from this reference, the Supreme
Court has only considered the issue in the context of a union's antitrust liability
and the union's invocation of immunity. 147 A limited number oflower courts
have allowed a management defendant to assert derivatively the non-statutory
exemption. H8 For the most part these cases have involved professional
sportS. H9
Employer assertion of the immunity raises a question regarding the
primary purpose of the exemption: Is it designed to protect unions or the colSee Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 633 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1980).
Management could be sued over the antitrust implications of a collective bargaining
provision by another employer or by labor. The ability of a union to bring suit, however, may be
contractually limited by the language of a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., NFLNFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. III, § 2 (1977-1982) (available in Boston College
Law School Library).
146 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
730-31 (1965).
147 See J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 18, § 5.05, at 551. See also supra notes
43-116 and accompanying text.
148 Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840,847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974). This
particular case, however, relied heavily on a prior case involving Scooper Dooper and the union
which was a party to Kraftco's bargaining agreement. Id. at 844-50. In the prior decision, the
union had successfully asserted the exemption against Scooper Dooper. Id. at 843. That decision
collaterally estopped Scooper Dooper in the Kraftco case. !d. at 850.
Suburban Beverages, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Wis. 1978),
was a suit by a distributor against a beer manufacturer. The court allowed the exemption and
held the brewer immune from antitrust liability for a restraint contained in a brewer-union
bargaining agreement. Id. at 1312. The opinion analyzed the propriety of the exemption, but did
not mention or, apparently, consider that an employer (as opposed to a union) was asserting it.
Id. at 1308-10. Both Krajtco and Suburban Beverages involved territorial work restrictions on an
employer which were related to the union's interest in job preservation for its members.
Grandad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1979), involved a suit against a baking company regarding its agreement with a union that only union
drivers would pick up and deliver its baked goods to its customers. In a suit by a non-union
distributor denied service at defendant's plant, the court allowed the employer to assert the exemption. Id. at 1109-11. The union had been a party to the litigation, but had settled with the
distributor and had been dropped from the lawsuit. Id. at 1107. Aside from the implicit recognition of an employer's ability to assert the exemption contained in its conclusion, the court did not
specifically deal with the issue.
149 See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 1976);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462,
14+
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lective bargaining process itself? 150 The bargaining process must necessarily be
the object of some protection since the non-statutory exemption immunizes
provisions of collective bargaining agr~ements. Some protection of employers
seems implicit in this judicial expansion of the statutory exemption. Given the
antitrust policies at issue and the Supreme Court's explanation of the exemption, however, some form of union involvement with a challenged bargaining
provision seems essential. An employer should receive immunity if he agrees to
a term which, in some fashion, originates with the union or involves union participation to such a degree that the union's integrity as employee representative
is entwined with the provision. 151 The non-sports precedent, however, does not
support granting the exemption to an employer when the provision at bar was
imposed by management (either unilaterally or in the bargaining context) or
embodies employer interests which are competitive or restrictive of the product
market. 152 The obligation to bargain cannot, by itself, be utilized by employers
to immunize conduct from the reach of antitrust laws. ISS
2. The Exemption as Applied in Professional Sports Cases
The professional sports setting provides a unique context for application of
the exemption. The identity of the labor market and the product market implies that any restraint upon the labor force affects the product market and
arguably involves management's competitive interests. 1H The non-sports
precedent, usually based on a differential between labor and product restraints,
must therefore be specially adapted to the particular needs of the sports industry .155 The inherently monopolistic nature of sports leagues also makes it

499 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also irifra notes 167-76, 220 and accompanying text.
150 See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 5.04, at 526-27 for the view that,
although the exemption originated as a device to protect unions, the ma.turity of the modern
labor movement dictates that the doctrine should now protect the bargaining process. The exemption should therefore be available to employers who bargain in good faith. This application
further validates labor law principles by lessening judicial scrutiny of substantive bargaining
terms. The parties are therefore free to shape their own contractual relationship. See also Comment, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 23, at 188.
151 See irifra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 71-94 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 89, 118 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. This is also the reason why, in the rule
of reason analysis, tht; league is able to argue that a labor restraint has actual, pro-competitive effects on the product market - the game involved. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League,
543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976).
.
155 Jewel Tea appears to be the decisioRmost direcdy relevant to the sports context. The
opinion analyzes a restraint involving both the labor and product markets of the retail meat industry. The case possessed an additional Climension, however, in that the suit was initiated by a
recalcitrant member of a multi-employer bargaining unit who alleged, in effect, that he was being
forced to accept the working hours-restraint at issue. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 680-81 (1965). The case therefore has overtones of the
traditional third party effect rather than simply being limited to labor and management in a
bargaining context. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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difficult for competitors to exist. 156 A capitalist wishing to own a team will
usually fmd his/her path blocked by a series of restrictive intraleague rules, including approval by a specified number of existing team owners (usually
unanimous or three-fourths) and exclusive territorial rights of existing teams to
their geographic area. 157 This fact diminishes entry-level competition because a
potential owner seeking to enter a certain market must establish an entirely
new league in addition to his own team. Thus, the competitive realities of professional sports differ from those of non-sports industries. Potential individual
competitors are subject to greater pressure to either cooperate with the existing
league or abandon their interest in team ownership. Consequently, sports litigation has heretofore involved a league against a league or management
against labor, but rarely an individual owner or potential owner against a
league or union. 15s Finally, prior to the 1970's, sports unions were relatively
ineffective in obtaining meaningful collective bargaining agreements which
would benefit their members.159 The courts assisted the unions in eliminating
this power imbalance by applying antitrust law to the labor-restrictive practices
previously imposed by management. 160 The purpose and application of the
exemption therefore could differ after unions have attained bargaining parity
and have engaged in true good faith bargaining.
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc. 161 and
Robertson v. National Basketball Association 162 are two of the first cases to consider
extensively the exemption's application in the professional sports context.
Philadelphia Hockey was a lawsuit initiated by teams of a new hockey league, the
World Hockey Association, against the established National Hockey League
(NHL).163 The new league claimed that the NHL, primarily through its
reserve clause and contractual arrangements with minor league teams,
restrained and monopolized the professional hockey market. 164 The defendant
NHL sought to avoid antitrust liability by arguing, among other points, that,
because the reserve clause was embodied within a collective bargaining agree-

156 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 695-96; Note, Professional Sports and the NonStatutory Labor Exemption to Federal Antitrust Law: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 11 U. TOL. L.
REv. 633,650 (1980); Kennedy and Williamson, supra note 17, § pt. 1.
157 See, e.g., NFL Constitution and By-Laws §§ 3.1(b), 4.1 and 4.2. An NFL team's
geographic exclusivity extends "seventy-five miles in every direction from the exterior corporate
limits" of the city in which the club is located. !d.
158 This trend may be ending as individual team owners, desirous of a different distribution of a sport's wealth, begin to challenge league practices restrictive of their ability to control
their own franchises. See infra notes 409-10 and accompanying text.
159 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 707, 741-53.
160 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
161 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The defendant, the National Hockey League, is
hereinafter referred to as the "NHL."
162 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
163 Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 468 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
16+ !d. at 466-67.
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ment with the National Hockey League Players' Association, the practices
challenged were protected by the labor law exemption. 165 Following a review of
applicable Supreme Court precedent,166 Judge Higginbotham of the federal
district court for eastern Philadelphia fashioned three conclusions regarding the
application of the exemption in the sports context:

1. The Supreme Court decisions were cases in which' 'the union had
been sued for its active, conspiratorial role in restraining competition of a product market, and the union, not the employer, sought
to invoke the labor exemptions. "167 The hockey case did not contain aI}-y evidence of a management-labor conspiracy; in fact, the
union had repeatedly sought to eliminate the restrictions at issue. 16S
2. The non-sports precedent "pertained to issues which furthered
the interests of union members and on which there had been
extensive collective bargaining."169 The current record disclosed
an absence of good faith bargaining regarding the unilaterally imposed reserve clause. 17o
3. Assuming there had been good faith bargaining, "those negotiations would not shield the National Hockey League from liability
in a suit by outside competitors who sought access to players
under the control of the National Hockey League." 171 Such an
agreement would be the equivalent ofthe management-labor conspiracy proscribed in Allen Bradley.172

!d. at 496.
Id. at 497-98.
167 !d. at 498.
168 !d.
169 !d. at 498-99.
170 !d. at 499.
171 !d.
172 !d. at 499-500. The district court stated:
In providing a special exemption from Sherman Act regulations for labor unions
and employers who in good faith negotiated with thOse unions, Congress atteJ.I1pted
to accommodate what frequently were conflicting public policies: the fostering and
preservation of competitive business conditions in a free enterprise system on one
hand, counter-balanced by a legitimate concern in improving and bettering the
working conditions of laborers and the reduction of industrial strife through
vigorous union organization and collective bargaining. The labor exemption which
could be defensively utilized by the union and employer as a shield against Sherman
Act proceedings when there was bona fide collective bargaining, could not be seized
upon by either party and destructively wielded as a sword by engaging in
monopolistic or other anti-competitive conduct. The shield cannot be transmuted
into a sword and still permit the beneficiary to invoke the narrowly carved out labor
exemption from the anti-trust laws. To allow and condone such conduct would
frustrate Congress' carefully orchestrated efforts to harmoniously blend together
two opposing public policies.
165
166

Id.
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Philadelphia Hockey appears to be fully consistent with non-sports case law
in denying the NHL its exemption claim. Although the court implicitly allowed
employers to raise the exemption through their participation in the collective
bargaining process, the grant ofimmunity was subject to stricter scrutiny when
it is not a union seeking the exemption. 173 In addition to requiring good faith
bargaining regarding the restraint, the opinion also implied that an appropriate subject of immunity should further the interests of the union
members. 174 This language indicates that, in addition to proper collective talks
and concessions, the substantive nature of the restraint - its pro-labor effect
- is a significant factor in the decision to provide an agreement with antitrust
insulation. Finally, Philadelphia Hockey applied Allen Bradley's denial of immunity for a management-labor conspiracy which significantly affects the product
market interests of the employer's competitors. 175 The NHL's reserve clause
was therefore subject to a complete antitrust analysis. 176
Robertson was a class action fIled on behalf of all professional basketball
players against the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the American
Basketball Association (ABA).177 The lawsuit was initiated after the two
leagues began merger discussions. 17s The players contended that a variety of
league practices violated the Sherman Act,179 that the older NBA had engaged
in predatory conduct regarding the newer ABA and that the proposed merger
violated the antitrust laws. ISO The opinion was written in response to the
players' motion for class action determination and the league's motion for
summary judgment. lSI In this context, Judge Carter of the southern district
court of New York evaluated the NBA's claim that all the practices at issue
were protected from antitrust liability by the labor law exemption. His opinion
began by noting that, although the exemption was created to benefit unions,
employers could assert derivatively the immunity when they have participated
in bargaining and are sued for provisions based on union activity. IS2 The
ld. at 500.
Id. at 498.
175 [d. at 500.
176 Judge Higginbotham in Philadelphia Hockey concluded that a preliminary injunction
should issue. against the NHL based on the likelihood that the league's system of player restraints
constituted an exercise of monopoly power in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.ld. at 517-18.
The court also ruled that a decision on whether § l..of the Sherman Act had been violated would
be inappropriate in the preliminary injunction setting. [d. at 504.
177 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 398 F. Supp. 867, 872-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
178 ld. at 873.
179 ld. at 874. The practices attacked were the college draft, the uniform reserve clause
and related compensation plan and various boycott and blacklisting techniques.ld. The National
Basketball Association and the American Basketball Association are hereinafter referred to,
respectively, as the "NBA" and the "ABA·."
180 [d. at 875-76.
181 ld. at 876.
182 ld. at 885-86. Judge Carter stated:
Allen Bradley made clear that the "labor exemption" was createa f!:'r the benefit of
unions. While later cases revealed the possibility of a circumscribed exemption for
173

tH
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leagues, having been accorded at least the right to claim the exemption, proposed a. two part analysis for employer assertion of the immunity:
The Test for applicability of the laBor exemption which emerges from
Jewel Tea and Pennington is twofold: 1) Are the challenged practices
directed against non-parties to the relationship; if they are not, then
2) are they m~datory subjects of collective bargaining? If the answer
to No.1 is no, and to No.2 yes, the practices are immune . . . .
NBA Memorandum at 28. 183
Judge Carter in Robertson rejected this formulation of the exemption and
denied the NBA the immunity it sought. 184 The proposed test embodied the
Goldberg position in Pennington and Jewel Tea. The Robertson decision recognized that the premise for the NBA's suggested criteria - automatic exemption for mandatory topics of bargaining - had been rejected by the Pennington
andJewel Tea majority .185 The opinion noted that, even under the league's proposed test, the exemption should not be permitted because the restraints noted
in the plaintiffs' complaint were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. 186 Even
assuming such topics were mandatory subjects, however, the court reasoned
that an appropriate exemption inquiry must focus on whether the provision at
issue was a result of union self-interest.187 Judge Carter then declared the
requirement of union self-interest could not be easily satisfied with regard to
these practices. 188 The plaintiff's complaint therefore survived summary judg-

employers, which might arise derivatively, and become effective when employers
are sued by third parties for the activities of unions, the protection of the exemption
is afforded only to employers who have actedjointIy with the labor organization in
connection with or in preparation for collective bargaining negotiations. See, e.g.,
Cordova v. Bache & Co., [321 F. Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)].
Id. at 886.
183 Robertson v. National Basketball Association, 398 F. Supp. 867, 886 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
18+ /d. at 887-89.
185 /d. at 888.
186 /d. at 889. The validity of this conclusion, at least regarding the collegiate draft and
the reserve clause, seems suspect considering later case law development. Contra McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 743
(D.D.C. 1976), qff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Berry and
Gould, supra note 1, at 793; J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 6.08, at 813-23.
187 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Robertson, 389 F. Supp. 867, 889, employs the standard set by the Second Circuit in Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970):
The test of whether labor union action 'is or is not within the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act is (1) whether the action is in the union's self-interest in an area which
is a proper subject of union concern and (2) whether the union is acting in combination with a group of employers. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.
Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 788 (1941); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3 [325 U.S. 797 (1945)].
Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d at 887.
188 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Judge Carter declared:
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ment and a plaintiff class was certified. 189 This ruling provided the impetus for
meaningful bargaining between the parties and, within a reasonable period, a
settlement agreement, including a new collective bargaining agreement, received judicial approval. 190
Philadelphia Hockey and Robertson established the framework for the application of the exemption to professional sports. Three subsequent cases - Smith v.
Pro-Football, Inc. ,191 Mackey v. National Football League,192 and McCourt v. California Sports, Inc. 193 - delineate the current exemption standards employed by
courts in this context. Smith was a lawsuit commenced by an individual player,
former first-round selection James Smith, against the Washington Redskins
and the National Football League. 194 The case only concerned the legality of
the NFL college player draft. 195 Smith had negotiated a one-year contract with
the Redskins. 196 During the last game of his rookie season, he received a neck
injury which terminated his career. 197 His complaint alleged that the player
draft system had restrained his ability to freely market his skills and therefore
had prevented him from obtaining a multi-year, guaranteed contract. 198 The
draft in practice when Smith entered the league was embodied in the NFL's
Constitution and By-Laws, and not in a collective bargaining agreement. 199
The district court in Smith examined the nature of the exemption prior to
conducting its substantive, antitrust analysis of the draft.20o The opinion initially rejected the NFL's contention that mandatory subjects of bargaining,

Conceivably, if the restrictions were part of the union policy deemed by the Players
Association to be in the players' best interest, they could be exempt from the reach
of the antitrust laws. . . . The proper inquiry in respect of this controversy is
whether the challenged restraints were ever the subject of serious, intensive,
arm's-length collective bargaining .... I must confess that ifis difficult for me to
conceive of any theory or set of circumstances pursuant to which the college draft,
blacklisting, boycotts and refusals to deal could be saved from Sherman Act condemnation, even if defendants were able to prove at trial their highly dubious contention that these restraints were adopted at the behest of the Players Association.
!d. at 895.
189 !d. at 896-903.
190 Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). This approval was subsequently affirmed by the Second Circuit. Robertson v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977). The appellate court noted that the agreement, including a
modified draft and compensation procedure, did not contain any provisions which were "clearly
illegal." !d. at 686.
191 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, rcv'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1978)
192 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), ecrt. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
193 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
19+ Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 740 (D.D.C. 1976).
195 Id. at 741.
196 Id. at 740.
197 Id. at 740-41.
198 Id. at 741.
199 Id.
200 !d.
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prior to their inclusion within a collective agreement, are proper subjects for
immunity.201 The court held that an employer practice "cannot under any circumstances come within the exemption unless and until it becomes part of a
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a union in its own self-interest."202 Since the Redskins drafted Smith prior to the first labor-management
football agreement, the player's claim could not be precluded by the exemption. 203
After rendering this holding for the case at bar, however, the district court
in Smith speculated upon the appropriateness of the exemption if the draft had
been embodied in a collective agreement. 204 The court commenced its examination by noting that, considering labor law precedent regarding bargaining over hiring halls 205 and seniority benefits, the draft would be considered a
term or condition of employment and therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining.206 The mandatory nature of the draft would thus ensure the presence
of adequate labor interests to justify a claim for exemption. Nonetheless, the
court reasoned that to qualify for immunity, the actual agreement must also be
the product of "genuine, arm's-length bargaining. "207 The opinion further
noted that the agreement cannot be an employer conspiracy to restrain a product market in which the union either participates or acquiesces, but must represent the union's own efforts in furtherance of its own self-interest.20B The court
concluded by observing that a player draft differs from traditional restraints in
that the draft produced a detrimental effect, not on the employer's competitors,
but on potential employees, "persons neither party to the agreement nor
members of a union which is party to the agreement." 209 Protection of such a
!d. at 741-44.
Id. at 742.
203 Id.
204 !d.
205 For a discussion of the nature of hiring halls and their relation to the draft, see infra
notes 290-96 and accompanying text.
206 Id. at 743.
207 Id.
208 Id. The district court stated:
The doctrine of those cases is to the effect that even when an agreement is related to
mandatory subjects, it must be examined to determine if it is: (1) An employers'
combination/conspiracy, in which the union has acquiesced, whose purpose is to fIx
prices, allocate markets, or drive competitors from the market (i.e., an attempt to
monopolize). Such an agreement does not fall within the exemption, see Allen
Bradley, supra. (2) Ajoint management-union combination/conspiracy to accomplish
those objectives, in which the union and management interests appear to coincide.
Such an agreement must be scrutinized for its relative impact on the product market
and the interests of union members, in light of national labor and antitrust policies.
(3) The result of the union's own efforts in its self-interest, free of any agreement
with or among the employers to attempt to accomplish those objectives. Only the
third kind of collective bargaining agreement on mandatory subjects has been given
an unqualified exemption from the antitrust laws subsequent to Jewel Tea and Pennington.
Id.
209 !d.
201

202
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group is less central to the purposes of antitrust law than the prohibition of
product market restraints. 21o On the other hand, since labor law is deeply concerned with allowing unions to freely negotiate bargains they consider best for
their members, the district court concluded that, if a union in pursuit of its own
interests agreed to a player draft, the procedure should be immune from antitrust liability.2ll The court then ruled that the draft, as then constituted, was a
substantive violation of the antitrust laws. 212
•
Mackey was a lawsuit brought by players against the NFL challenging the
validity of the league's free agent compensation system. 213 In 1963, management had unilaterally imposed a procedure whereby a player who had completed the term of his contract was free to reach an agreement with any other
club in the league, but a new club acquiring a free agent was required to
compensate the old club for the loss of its player. 214 If the two clubs could not
agree on appropriatb compensation, the commissioner of the league, Pete
Rozelle, would, in his sole discretion, determine fair and equitable compensation (hence the name "Rozelle Rule").215 The rule was contained in the NFL
Constitution and By-Laws effective at that time. 216 The 1970 collective
bargaining agreement did not expressly refer to the Rozelle Rule nor did it explicitly incorporate the NFL Constitution and By-Laws. The agreement,
however, required all players to sign the Standard Player Contract, and that
individual agreement hound each player to comply with the Constitution and
By-Laws. 217 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that this
reference was sufficient to include the Rozelle Rule within the ambit of the collective bargaining agreement. 218 The Mackey court first rejected the players'
contention that only employee groups could assert the exemption. 219 Since the
exemption attached to the collective agreement, either party could derive such
a benefit from its terms. 220 This holding, combined with the characterization of

!d. at 744.
!d.
212 !d. at 744-47. The district court concluded that the draft was a per se violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act and, in the alternative, a violation of the rule of reason standard. !d. at 745-47.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the
per se analysis- was inappropriate for the football business, but affirmed the rule of reason violation. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The appellate court
also reversed on the standard of damages sustained. ld. at 1189-91.
213 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976).
2B ld. at 610-11.
215 ld.
211> ld. Section 12.1(H) of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws (quoted in Mackey v. National Footbal League, 543 F.2d at 610-11). The circuit court noted that between 1963 and 1974,
176 players played out their options. !d. at 611. Of that group, 34 signed with other teams. !d. In
three cases, the former club waived compensation. ld. In 27 cases, the clubs involved agreed on
compensation. ld. In four cases, the Commissioner awarded compensation. !d.
217 ld.
210

211

2181d.
!d. at 612.

219

220

!d.
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the Rule as being within the agreement, meant that the league had a viable
claim to immunity.221 The decision in Mackey therefore subtly expanded the
scope of the exemption by concluding that the Ro~elle Rule, although not
specifically mentioned, referred to or incorporated, was a part of the collective
agreement and thus a candidate for exempt status. 222
The Eighth Circuit in Mackey then analyzed the principles underlying the
exemption cases and formulated a widely influential, three-part test for granting immunity:223
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially
be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on
trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second, federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to
prevail only where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining. 224
The Rozelle Rule clearly affected only the parties to the bargaining agreement,
and the circuit c~urt found the Rule to be a mandatory subject of bargaining
because it restricted a player's team-to-team movement and depressed
salaries. 225 The district court record, however, did not reveal any good faith
bargaining concerning the Rule. 226 The compensation provision was unilaterally promulgated by the league and then imposed by the league on a weak
union in the first two bargaining agreements. 227 The circuit court therefore
used its interpretation of good faith bargainng to fortify the union and give it
increased bargaining leverage through the imposition of antitrust liability. The
Eighth Circuit, however, again expanded the exemption by suggesting that
evidence of a quid pro quo - union agreement to the unmodified rule in exchange for other benefits - might satisfy this requirement. 228 Since no such
give and take had been found by the district court in the parties' bargaining
history,229 however, the Mackey court denied exempt status and found the
/d. at 615.
See infra notes 260, 301-13 and accompanying text. The 1970 NFL agreement also
contained a "zipper clause" which read as follows: "[T]his Agreement represents a complete
and fmal understanding of all bargainable subjects of negotiation among the parties during the
term of this Agreement.... " Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606,613 (8th Cir.
1976). This agreement had expired in 1974 and the union, seeking the elimination of the Rozelle
Rule, had been unable to produce an agreement with the league. /d.
223 See, e.g., Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 769; Comment, Sport in Court: The Legality
of Professional Football's System of Reserve and Compensation, 28 UCLA L. REv. 252, 283 (1980).
m Mackey v. Nationhl Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
225 /d. at 615.
226 [d. at 615-16.
221

222

227
228
229

/d.
/d. at 616.
/d.

March 1983]

MATURING SPORTS INDUSTRY

371

Rozelle Rule to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, pursuant to the rule of
reason analysis. 230 The Eight Circuit's position, therefore, is that the exemption precludes an antitrust suit by a union or its members after legitimate good
faith bargaining has occurred regarding the challenged provision. 231
McCourt is the last major sports case to deal with the exemption issue. 232
Suit was instituted by a Detroit Red Wings player, Dale McCourt, against the
National Hockey League, the Players' Association and the Los Angeles and
Detroit teams.233 The Detroit Red Wings had previously signed a free agent
goal-tender who had played out his option from Los Angeles. 234 According to
NHL By-Law 9A, the Red Wings were obligated to provide an equalization
payment to the Los Angeles Kings. 235 When the two clubs could not reach
agreement Qn compensation, they both submitted a compensation proposal to
an independent arbitrator as required by the By-Law. 236 The arbitrator
selected the Los Angeles proposal and assigned McCourt, the only player the
Los Angeles Kings requested, to the California team. 237 McCourt refused to
report and fIled suit challenging the compensation procedure. 238 The compensation By-Law was specifically referred to and incorporated in the latest collective bargaining agreement and compliance with the league By-Laws was incorporated into each individual player contract. 239
On appeal from a district court decision holding By-Law 9A to constitute
an antitrust violation and enjoining its enforcement against the plaintiff,240 the
Sixth Circuit began its exemption analysis in McCourt by specifically adopting
the three part test established by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey.241 As in the
earlier football case, the court quickly noted that the first two aspects of the test
- restraint primarily affecting only the parties and a mandatory subject of bargaining - were both satisfied here. 242 A compensation plan only affected
veteran players and clearly involved the terms and conditions of their employ-

230 Id. at 622. The Eighth Circuit ruled that a fmding of per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act was not warranted in this context. Id at 619-20.
231 After the appellate decision in Mackey, the case was remanded to the district court.
There, the lawsuit was certified as a class action and a settlement agreement, referring to a newly
negotiated collective bargaining agreement, was approved by the court. Alexander v. National
Football League, 1977-2 Trade Cases (CCH), 161,730 (D. Minn. 1977). On appeal, the approval of the settlement was affirmed and the Eighth Circuit noted that, since true good faith
bargaining had occurred, practices embodied in the agreement were protected by the exemption.
Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 288 (8th Cir. 1978).
232 McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1979).
233 Id.
23+ [d. at 1196.
235 Id.
236 [d.
237 Id.
238 [d.
239 Id. at 1194-95.
240 Id. at 1196.
2+1 Id. at 1197-98.
242 [d. at 1198.
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ment. 243 The issue in the case, therefore, was narrowed to the question of good
faith bargaining. 244 After reviewing the bargaining history of the league in
detail , 245 the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion and
held that good faith bargaining had occurred. 246 The circuit court cited tradi·
tionallabor law principles in the non·exemption context to support its two·part
analysis of the bargaining obligation. The inclusion of the By·Law in the exact
form of management's previously imposed rule did not evidence a lack of bar·
gaining, but rather the union's failure, after intense negotiations, to keep "an
unwanted provision out of the contract. "247 Good faith bargaining does not re·
quire either side to make a concession or yield on a particular point. 248 Labor
law does not mandate substantive terms of agreement and the duty to bargain
in good faith permits a party to stand firmly on a proposal if its "insistence is
genuinely and sincerely held." 249 Second, the opinion noted that the union had
applied bargaining pressure to keep the compensation plan out and, when un·
successful in that effort, obtained considerable benefits from the league as the
price of inclusion. 250 The incorporated By·Law was therefore entitled to the ex·
emption and judgment was entered for the defendants.
3. A Proposal for Future Sports Cases

Mackey and McCourt expand the labor exemption from antitrust liability to
a point not justified by exemption precedent. This expansion seems particular·
ly inappropriate in light of the restrictive interpretation given the exemption by
the Supreme Court in Connell.251 Moreover, the Mackey test, coupled with the
McCourt interpretation of good faith bargaining, is somewhat illusory. The sec·
ond and third parts of the test - mandatory subject and good faith bargaining
- are actually one requirement. If a topic is a mandatory subject, the NLRA
makes it an unfair labor practice for either management or labor to refuse to
bargain in good faith. 252 Assuming sports unions have achieved an appropriate
amount of bargaining power,253 future application of the Mackey test, in a suit
brought by one of the parties to the agreement, will reduce itself to the issue of
2~3

/d.

2H

Id.

m

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

246

2H

at 1199-1200.
at 1203.

at 1200-02.
at 1201.
250
at 1202 n.12. The trial court had specifically found that the increased benefits and
rights contained in the agreement were not a quid pro quo for inclusion of Bylaw 9A and were not
direcdy related to collective bargaining on that subject. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460
F. Supp. 904, 911 (E.D. Mich. 1978). See Weistart, Judicial Review oj Labor Agreements: Lessons
From the Sports Industry, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 125 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
WeistartJ.
251 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 87.
253 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
248

2~9
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whether the challenged restraint was a mandatory subject of bargaining. In this
sense, the Mackey-McCourt test is equivalent to the inquiry proposed by the
NBA and rejected in Robertson. 254 Such an application embodies the Goldberg
position in Pennington andJewel Tea that mandatory subjects are entitled to an
automatic exemption because management and labor must bargain about
them. 255 This interpretation was rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court
in those cases. The White opinion inJewel Tea, a suit between parties to a collective bargaining relationship, emphasized that the mandatory nature of the
topic, and implicitly the good faith bargaining required of mandatory topics,
were not, by themselves, sufficient to justify the granting of the exemption. 256
The challenged restriction must be of direct and immediate concern to the
union's members and the restriction must be at the behest of a non-labor
groUp.257 The Mackey;:McCourt test, therefore, does not sufficiently embody the
holdings of Jewel Tea and Pennington.
The Mackey-McCourt test places undue emphasis on protecting the bargaining process while giving insufficient attention to the labor-oriented source of
the exemption. 258 Jewel Tea, Pennington, Philadelphia Hockey and Robertson all emphasize that an immunized restraint should, in some respect, further the interests of the labor force and not be at the behest of employers. 259 Bargaining
agreements are granted the exemption because they embody this labor interest,
and employers' assertion of the immunity should only be derived from management conduct consistent with the labor interest. Mackey's expansion of the
concept of an incorporated term, cOf!1bined with the first part of the McCourt interpretation of good-faith bargaining, implies that management can unilaterally formulate a rule, insist (sincerely) on a reference to it in the collective agreement and retain antitrust immunity. However desirable such a system might
be in theory, 260 such a result does not appear justified by the non-MackeyMcCourt cases. 261 Undue emphasis on the traditional concept-of good-faith bargaining, wholly appropriate in a normal bargaining or unfair labor practice

256

See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 103-05, 123-28 and accompanying text.

257

!d.

25+

255

See Casenote, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Anticompelitive Provision
Devised by an Employer Group in its Own Interest: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C. L.
REv. 680, 711-13 (1980).
259 See supra notes 169, 188 and accompanying text. The Mackf:y-McCourt test appears to
address this concern by looking for a quid pro quo - some benefits to labor in exchange for inclusion of the restraint - in this bargaining history. That inquiry, however, does not appear to be
required by the three point test. The appropriate weight to be given such a consideration is
discussed infra at notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
260 Sec, c.g., Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 766-69;J. WEISTART& C. LoWELL,supra
note 18, § 5.04, at 527; and Comment, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 23, at 184-85.
261 The possibility of improper application of the exemption appears higher considering
the expansive interpretation given to the concept of mandatory subject of bargaining in traditional labor law decisions. Sec NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958); R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, at ch. 11, §§ 1-9.
258
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context, does not seem warranted in the assessment of whether or not to grant
the exemption. 262 The union oriented source of the immunity and the balancing of antitrust concerns noted in Connell'indicate that a different test would
better serve exemption purposes.
The flrst prong of the Mackey-McCourt test - the restraint primarily affects
only parties to the collective bargaining relationship - should continue as the
initial inquiry regarding the exemption and the sports industry. The denial of
immunity to restraints with non-unit effects sustains the'Allen Bradley concept of
conspiracy and the Pennington qisavowal of exemption for practices which further the competitive interests 9f management. 263 This requirement further
acknowledges that, in sports, restraints on the labor market are restraints on
the product market. 264 With the notable exception of the college draft and rules
relating to player entry,265 this requirement should be easily satisfied for most
bargaining agreement provisions.
The second requirement of the test - the provision should be a mandatory subject of bargaining - should also be retained. Labor law interest in
non-mandatory subjects is not sufficient to justify overriding antitrust interests.
The danger of unilateral imposition by management of terms and provisions in
fact directed at the owners' competitors increases as those provisions stray from
mandatory subjects. 266 This requirement, however, will easily be satisfied in
most instances, since courts and the National Labor Relations Board continue
to give the mandatory -subject area an expansive interpretation. 267 Assuming
that the labor-management relationship has matured in most sports leagues,
this requirement will include the concept of good-faith bargaining. Failure to
bargain in good faith should increasingly be a labor law/unfair labor practice
question while the bargaining process is continuing. 268 These flrst two requirements, however, are indeed separate and distinct: a practice can be properly characterized as mandatory and still affect parties outside the bargaining
relationship. 269
If these two requirements of the proposed test are satisfied, the granting of
the exemption should tum on the source of the restraint and its treatment by
262 Pennington clearly held that, simply because parties must bargain, they are not free to
disregard other laws. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 318 U.S. 657, 664-65 (1965). Mackey
may have emphasized good faith bargaining in an effort to support a weak players union and encourage the parties actually to bargain. See supra notes 16,17, and accompanying text. Future application of such a test, as evidenced by McCourt, distorts the origin and proper use of the exemption.
263 See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 499-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Weistart, supra note 250, at 112.
26~ See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
265 See irifra notes 289-300 and accompanying text.
266 See R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, ch. 11, § 7; contra Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at
766.
267 See supra note 261; Berry and 'Gould, supra note 1, at 793-94.
268 See infra notes 344-48 and accompanying text.
269 For example, see the discussion regarding the draft, irifra notes 289-300 and accompanying text.
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the parties in their bargaining. Although labor law rules should dominate the
conduct of a mature management-labor relationship,270 this inquiry is required
to recognize the pro-union orientation of the exemption and to give antitrust
concerns their proper weight in the Connell balancing process. 271 If the questioned provision was initiated by the union in substantially the form fmally
adopted, employer acquiescence to the union demand should also be protected
by the exemption. If, however, the term at issue was initiated ,by management
or significandy embodies management interests, the exemption should be
granted only if there has been adequate union participation in the structuring
of the finally agreed upon proposal. Adequate union participation in this sense
means that the management proposal has undergone some significant modification by the union prior to acceptance or that the union has received a specific, significant quid pro quo in exchange for inclusion of the term. The judicial
inquiry, in the case of non-labor initiated proposals, would thereby be focused
on the integrity of the union as exclusive employee representative. The exemption should be granted when labor law considerations indicate that an individual employee should not be allowed to "second guess" the wisdom of the union
in making concessions or modifications. 272 The integrity of the bargaining
process also dictates that a union should not be free to second guess itself regarding a provision which the bargaining history indicates it had a hand in
shaping or which it "sold." In such situations, the derived employer immunity
can be justified by the need, to this extent, to preserve the integrity of the union
and the bargaining process and by management's reliance upon the exclusive
nature of the union's collective representation. Courts can police application of
this aspect of the test by searching for a specific quid pro quo for unmodified
management proposals. 273
The proposed test gives que consideration to the Supreme Court's concern
that immunized provisions not result from the behest of non-labor groups but

270 See infra notes 335-40 and accompanying text. If a claim of damages results from use
of an economic weapon specifically sanctioned by federal labor law (e.g., strike or lockout), the
exemption should immunize the practice from antitrust liability. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butchers Workmen of N. Am., Local Union No. 576 v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597
F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979) (union alleging harm from replacement workers brought in while union
was on strike); Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris, 511 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Wash.
1981) (union alleging harm from employer lockout - employer granted immunity).
271 See St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 614-15, for an expression of the fear that courts will
not be able to distinguish between union motivated and employer motivated provisions. The
principles analyzed in this article hopefully will obviate that concern in the sports context.
272 Such employee-union disputes are best settled through the union election process or
through enforcement of the union's duty of fair representation. See infra notes 385-417 and accompanying text.
273 This proposal would influence the conduct of the parties at the bargaining table and
the bargaining ritual to a limited extent. For example, if management wished to open a bargaining session with a compromise or "reasonable" proposal, it should indicate for the bargaining
record the specific labor interests which it took into account in formulating the compromise it is
suggesting. The union would then be free to note its acceptance or rejection of the proposal and,
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rather be the direct product of a union's self-interest.274 It also balances the
pro-union origin of the exemption with the labor law interest in protecting the
bargaining process by allowing an employer to assert the exemption for any collective bargaining provision which evidences union participation. 275 Although
courts, as a matter oflabor policy, should avoid interference with the substantive terms and concessions of parties to the collective bargaining process in the
non-exemption context, the rejection of the Goldberg position inJewel Tea and
the nature of the exemption as promulgated by the Supreme Court justify the
limited intrusion included within the proposed analysis. 276 Finally, the McCourt
result can still be supported by this reasoning. Under the proposed test, the
Sixth Circuit should eliminate its initial emphasis on the non-exemption
interpretation of good faith bargaining and the unilateral insistence of management permitted thereby. The circuit court should accept the standard of the
district court and clearly focus upon the degree of union participation in the
structuring of By-Law 9A as evidenced by the labor group's acceptance of
financial benefits specifically offered by the league as quid pro quo for the inclusion of the compensation system. 277 If the benefits granted by management
impliedly, its agreement or disagreement with the weight management accorded the specified
labor interests.
27i See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
275 Professor Weistart has recently proposed a "presumption of consent" test for the application of the exemption. He cites Mackey for the proposition that, if bargaining exists at a
requisite level, the union can fend for itself and it is unnecessary to ask if employee interests are
advanced by an agreement. Weistart, supra note 250, at 119. He then suggests that respect for the
bargaining p~ocess dictates that employees be presumed to have consented to any term in an
agreement (and such a provision should be entitled to the exemption) unless the bargaining relationship has been newly formed or there is evidence that the strength of an established union has
eroded. !d. at 128-29.
The proposed test appears to protect excessively the bargaining process at the expense of
the pro-labor source of the exemption noted in this article. In addition, the presumption frequently can be incorrect. Unions in existence for years are not necessarily strong unions (e.g., the
NFLPA in the years prior to the Mackey decision) and new relationships may favor the union
(e.g., the potential bargaining of the NFLPA with the new United States Football League). Finally, the question of the eroded strength of a union would appear to involve a court in a difficult examination of internal union politics. In sum, the principles underlying the presumption can only
be effectuated by analyzing the agreement obtained by a union and the bargaining which produced it. A proper accommodation of the varied interests relevant to the exemption issue would
appear to require the case by case analysis proposed in this article.
276 A reviewing court, therefore, would not be dictating substantive terms to the parties.
The court wotlld simply be stating that, if sufficient union participation in the proposal has not
occurred, the union or individual employees retain the option of antitrust litigation. While this
contains coercive elements, management is free to decide what concessions justify the risk of antitrust liability. A similar examination of bargaining history occurred pursuant to the MackeyMcCourt test. But see Weistart, supra note 250, at 126-28. Professor Weistart, however, does note
that limited inquiries into the bargaining history of affected parties have occurred under the
Mackey-McCourt test and in other labor law contexts. !d. at 127 n.92. The nature of the exemption
justifies such an inquiry. See supra note 273. Such an inquiry would also seem likely pursuant to
the "presumption of consent" test proposed by Professor Weistart. See supra note 275. See also
the examination of bargaining contained in an arbitration hearing, NFLPA v. NFL Management Council (Dutton) (May 14, 1980) (available at Boston College Law School Library).
277 See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
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were directly related to the acceptance of By-Law 9A, the exemption should
apply.278

4. Application of the Proposal: The Continuing Function of the Exemption
In the near future, courts will be required to apply the exemption to a
variety ofleague practices. Restrictions on players' movement, procedures for
drafting high school or college athletes, provisions in league charters and bylaws and practices enforced by management in the absence of an effective
agreement are likely candidates for challenge. 279 Applying the exemption principles, player challenges to free agent compensation systems should normally
qualify for exempt status. As in Mackey and McCourt, such provisions affect
members ofthe union and are generally considered mandatory subjects of bargaining. 280 The compensation provisions of most professional leagues appear to
reflect significant union participation in the rules as finally adopted. 281
Football presents an interesting subissue in the exemption's application.
In an arbitration hearing, the National Football League Players' Association
(NFLPA) contended that the compensation rule being enforced by the NFL
was not what it had bargained for and attained in its agreement. 282 The agreement stated that, if a player did not receive an offer from a new club, he could
sign again with his old club (1) at the old club's last best written offer or (2) at a
10% raise for one year. 283 The owners interpreted the agreement to mean that,
if a player exercised option (2) for one year, he would, at the end of that period,
again be subject to the compensation rules of Article XV. 284 The union contended that, once a player had gone through the compensation procedure and
then played another year with his old club under option (2), he was truly free
and not subject to the agreement's compensation provisions. 285 Tlie agreement
itself was silent on the point. 286 The arbitrator, after reviewing the bargaining
history of the parties, accepted management's interpretation. 287 Cases in which

!d.
Due to player dissatisfaction and rapidly increasing media revenue, professional
football seems to be the most likely sport to be involved in future labor-management litigation.
See supra note 28. This discussion accordingly emphasizes professional football considerations.
280 See supra notes 44, 54 and accompanying text.
281 See National Basketball Players Association Agreement, Art. XXII (1980-1982),
Basic Agreement between the American and National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs
and MLBPA, Art. XVIII (1980-1983) (available at Boston College Law School Library). Due to
the restrictive nature of the football compensation provisions, the union has been accused of
undermining player interests in exchange for union security provisions. See Roberts and Powers,
supra note 24, at 465-66. Such charges are best considered in an evaluation of the union's breach
of its duty of fair representation rather than an antitrust suit against the league.
282 NFLPA v. NFL Management Council (Dutton) (May 14, 1980), supra note 276.
283 NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. XV, § 17 (available at Boston
College Law School Library).
28+ Dutton, supra note 276, at 31.
285 Dutton, supra note 276, at 30.
286 Dutton, supra note 276, at 40-41.
278
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the union does not actually receive what it believes it bargained for should be
treated as issues of contract interpretation rather than questions of antitrust
law. If the collective agreement accepteo by the union contains a procedure for
arbitration of disputes, labor, in a real sense, bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of ambiguous language. 288 If no arbitration procedure exists, a
court should perform the function of an arbitrator and interpret the contractual
language and, if necessary, the bargaining history to effectuate the good-faith
intent of the parties. In either case, labor law interests inherent in any such
situation would clearly seem to preclude the imposition of antitrust liability.
The relationship between the player draft system and the exemption poses
a different problem of application. Assuming that the draft is a mandatory subject ofbargaining289 and that unions have participated to some extent in forming the drafting rules, a question remains as to whether prospective players are
parties to the bargaining relationship. The primary issue in a challenge to the
draft would therefore be the first requirement of both the Mackey and the proposed tests: does the restraint primarily affect only parties to the bargaining
relationship? Players are not members of the league until they have gone
through the drafting process, signed contracts and made the team. If a collegiate athlete brought suit against a league challenging its draft on antitrust
grounds, a court would have difficulty characterizing the player as a party to
even the bargaining "relationship" prior to his signing a contract. The
arguments supporting the inclusion of prospective union members as parties to
the relationship have frequendy been based on an analogy to non-sports cases
holding that union hiring halls are a mandatory subject of bargaining. 290
Although such a comparison seems relevant for the determination that the
draft is a mandatory subject of bargaining, the argument does not apply with
equal force to the non-unit effects of the restraint. Usage of the analogy in both
contexts implies that the first two requirements of Mackey are actually one -:.
whether the draft is a mandatory subject of bargaining. As noted above, this
single issue analysis has been rejected by the Supreme Court. 291
The hiring hall analogy is a particularly inappropriate vehicle for extending the exemption beyond the parties to the bargaining agreement. Hiring halls
Dutton, supra note 276, at 45.
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
289 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
290 See Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (D.D.C. 1976), '!!I'd in
part, rcv'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, §
5.05, at 552-54; Comment, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 23, at 181 n.65;Jacobs and Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 16
(1971) [hereinafter referred to as Jacobs and Winter]. Hiring halls are, in effect, a job referral
service provided by unions. In certain industries (usually maritime and construction), employers
have short-lived and irregular employment needs. In these areas, prospective employees register
with a union hall. The employer, when the need for employees arises, goes to the hall and obtains
a qualified and available labor force. The union supplies workers based on "neutral" or "objective" criteria. See R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, at Chap. 28, § 9.
291 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
287

288
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are perceived as enhancing union security and increasing employee salaries. 292
The hiring hall is limited to unique occupations and an employee is free to reject any assignment he obtains from the hall. 293 Since these job assignments
tend to be short-term, there are no long-term prejudicial effects of the procedure. 294 Hiring halls therefore have been characterized as mandatory subjects because, like the exemption, they concern the integrity of the union
itself.295 Conversely, drafts depress player salaries and frequently force the individual player to sign a long-term contract with a club not of his choosing. 296
A series of decisions meant to enhance union status and employee interests
should not be used to extend the insulation of an anti-labor practice.
Requiring the union to bargain over terms of entry should not imply that
future employees are parties to the bargaining relationship. This is particularly
true in sports, where the union is frequently hostile to the interests of draftees
and their ability to command large salaries.. 297 The union therefore may not be
truly representing the interests of draftees and prospective players. 298 Prospective players may not have standing to sue a union for breach of its duty of fair
representation. 299 Draftees therefore would be left with no legal recourse if they
were to be considered parties to the bargaining relationship for exemption purposes but not members of the unit for the fair representation obligation. This
legal incongruity can be best avoided by denying the exemption in the drafteeinitiated lawsuit. 30o
In addition, players could challenge provisions affecting them which are
found in a league's Constitution and By-Laws. The granting of exemption
should not focus on whether the By-Laws were incorporated in the agreement
or whether the bargaining agreement contains a "zipper clause," but rather
upon whether the union participated in the structuring of the rule as constituted. 301 Football provides a convenient context for examhiing problems in this
292 See Local 357, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. National Labor Relations Board,
365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961); Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 506. In deciding that hiring
halls were mandatory subjects of bargaining, the Fifth Circuit has held that hiring halls are at the
essence of employee security in those industries where it is used. National Labor Relations Board
v. Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 349 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1965).
293 R. GORMAN, supra note 90, Ch. 28, § 9, at 664-65.
29i !d.
295 Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 506.
296 Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1185-87 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
297 This is particularly true in football where veteran salaries are low and college football
gives some rookies the market power to achieve high salaries. See NFLPA PAMPHLET, supra note
2, at 38-39; Roberts and Powers, supra note 24, at 459.
29B It is interesting to note that the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement expired onJuly 15, 1982, except for the restrictive provisions of the college draft, the "principles"
of which apply "through at least 1986." NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art.
XIII, § 1 (1977-1982) (available at Boston College Law School Library).
299 See infra notes 389-93 and accompanying text.
300 There are many practical reasons why amateur athleL~~ mar have no incentive to
challenge the draft. See, e.g., Burkow & Slaughter, Should Amateur Athletes Resist the Draft?, 7
BLACK L.J. 314, 315-16 (1980).
301 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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area. The football collective bargaining agreement states that any terms of the
NFL Constitution and By-Laws which are not inconsistent with the agreement
are to remain in full force and effect and all parties agree to be bound by such
terms. 302 This reference, combined with management's assertion that general
economic benefits (e.g., pension payments, minimum salaries) to labor were
the quid pro quo for its inclusion, should not, by itself, be sufficient to justify
granting the exemption. Courts should require a specific quid pro quo for inclusion of a practice or direct evidence of union participation in the shaping of
the rule.
A By-Law provision likely to be challenged in the future is the term
regulating eligibility for the draft.303 NFL teams cannot draft or sign a player
unless (1) all college eligibility of the player has expired or (2) five years have
passed since the player would have entered college or (3) the player receives a
diploma from a recognized university or college. 304 The rule keeps underclassmen from playing professional football, but it also means that, if a player does
not go to college or drops out of school, he must waitfive years from the date of
his high school graduation before he can play. Unless he plays four seasons of
college football, therefore, a player must wait an extra year or receive his
diploma in order to play professional football. This eligibility system is now
limited to football. Baseball and hockey have traditionally drafted athletes prior
to collegiate competition. 305 Basketball had eligibility provisions similar to football. Those restrictions were declared violative of the antitrust laws in a suit
brought against the league by a college superstar, Spencer Haywood. 306
Following the Haywood litigation, the NBA modified its eligibility requirements to permit the drafting of underclassmen through the hardship prOcess. 307
Significantly, the opinion in the Haywood case did not consider the applicabili-

NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. I, § 2.
A college star could challenge the rule in order to enter professional football sooner
than the rules allow him. See Davidson, Mom's Advice Keeps Herschel at Georgia, (Herschel Walker),
'THE SPORTING NEWS, April 3, 1982, at 7, cols. 1-3.
'Of NFL Constitution and By-Laws, § 12.1(A).
305 Baseball traditionally drafts players after their senior year of high school or their
junior year of college. Hockey traditionally drafts players of post-high school years from the
junior hockey leagues. Neither baseball nor hockey provide for their draft in a collective bargaining agreement. Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 790-91.
306 Denver-Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
Haywood was signed by the Denver Rockets Club, then of the ABA, after his sophomore season.
[d. at 1052.
The ABA, at the time, did not' have any draft eligibility restrictions. Mter playing for
Denver for one year and undergoing a series of contractual signings and misunderstandings,
Haywood signed to play with the Seattle Supersonics of the then rival NBA. /d. at 1054. When
the NBA refused to allow Haywood to play because his high school class had not yet graduated
college, he initiated suit against the league. /d. The court granted Haywood a preliminary injunction based on the substantial probability that the NBA's eligibility By-Law was a group
boycott and a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. [d. at 1066·67.
307 National Basketball Players Association Agreement, Art. XXII, § 1(t) (1980-1982)
(available at Boston College Law School Library).
302
303
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ty of the exemption. This type of lawsuit, therefore, would not appear to
qualify for the exemption. In addition to the question of an underclassmen being a party to the bargaining relationship,308 the union has not meaningfully
participated in the adoption of this rule. The suit therefore should proceed to
the issue of substantive antitrust violations. 309
Other provisions in the Constitution and By-Laws directly affect player
movement and salaries. If a veteran player performs his contract obligation to
an NFL team and then signs with a different league, the collective bargaining
agreement does not deal with the issue of the old team's player rights if the
player returns to the NFL following the termination of the other league's contract. NFL teams have maintained that the former club retains the exclusive
rights to such a player because, on his departure from the NFL, the old club
placed the player's name on a reserve or retired status list provided for by the
By-Laws. 31o A player in such a position should be able to litigate the antitrust
validity of the rule restricting his freedom if, in fact, it has been unilaterally imposed by management. Additionally, NFL owners split television revenues
equally.311 This method of revenue sharing allegedly allows the owners to control player salaries and eliminates the economic incentive for owners to bid on
free agents. 312 Players or the union should be free to challenge this practice and
its price/salary fIxing effects if, in fact, the system has not been the product of
active union participation. 313
Finally, future application of the exemption may arise when there is no
collective bargaining agreement in force in any particular league. If this situation occurs during the formative stage of a new league, the practices imposed
by the new owners would not appear to qualify for the exemption ,under either
the Mackey-McCourt test or the one proposed in this article. This result does not
appear unduly harsh because, unlike the legal principles applicable to owners
when the traditional leagues were formed,314 newly created' owners should be
See supra notes 289-300 and accompanying text.
Suits of this nature arguably would not qualify for the exemption even under the
Mackey-McCourt good faith bargaining standard.
310 NFL Constitution and By-Laws, § 17.6. A quarterback for the Los Angeles Rams,
Vince Ferragamo, recently played out his option with the team and signed with the former Montreal AIouettes of the Canadian Football League. After playing one season in Canada, the
AIouettes went bankrupt and Ferragamo was released from his Canadian contract. The Rams
claimed exclusive rights to Ferragamo and he re-signed with them. Didinger, Can FerragaTTW Win
Job?, THE SPORTING NEWS, August 16, 1982, at 2, cols. 1-3.
311 NFL Constitution and By-Laws, § 10.3.
312 NFLPA PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 30-31. This perceived fact of economic life in
professional football inspired the NFLPA to reject seeking no-compensation free agency and to
request instead a specified percentage of the owners' gross income to be paid as player salaries.
See supra note 27.
313 The federal statute granting NFL teams an antitrust exemption for the purpose of
bargaining as a single group with the broadcast industry does not appear to immunize the
method by which the fruits of such negotiations are distributed. See Sports Broadcasting Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). For a possible challenge to this shared revenue system by an NFL owner,
see infra note 436 and accompanying text.
3If See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
308

309
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aware of their potential antitrust liability and should shape their rules accordingly.sl5 The lack of a bargaining agreement, however, can also occur after a
current agreement expires and before·a new one can be negotiated. 1I16 If
management continues to enforce player restrictions during such an interval,
the issue becomes whether such practices should receive immunity from the
antitrust laws.
The answer to whether such immunity should apply during the interval
between expiration of an old contract and negotiation of a new one should
focus on the source of the restraint and the extent of the union's participation in
shaping it. The clearest case for granting immuity would be that in which management simply continued the exact practices contained in the now expired
agreement. If the restraints are identical, the same principles governing the exemption during the life of the agreement should control the impasse period. If
the union participated in the creation of the rule, protection of the bargaining
process and labor law interests dictate that the exemption should continue during impasse. 317 If, however, an employer significantly modifies a rule and then
seeks to impose it during an impasse period, courts should be reluctant to grant
the exemption. Some commentators have argued that, if the employer proposes
the modified rule to the union and an impasse is produced, unilateral employer
change consistent with past offers to the union satisfies the employer's duty to
bargain in good faith and should-receive the exemption. 3lB As noted in the prior
discussion, the application of good faith bargaining principles to the granting of
immunity distorts the origin and purposes of the exemption. 319 Unilaterally imposed employer restraints should not derive benefit from a labor oriented exemption. If the union has participated in the molding of the modified practice,
the exemption should be granted; if the union has not, the employer's
unilateral imposition should run the risk of antitrust liability. 320

31S A new football league, the United States Football League, is set to begin play in
March 1983. See Balzer, USFL: You've Gotta Know the Territory, THE SPORTING NEWS, August 23,
1982, at 44, cols. 1-3.
316 The NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement expired on July 15, 1982.
When the last agreement expired in 1974, management and labor could not conclude a new
agreement until the settlement of the Alexander case in August of 1977. Alexander v. National
Football League, 1977-2 Trade Cases (CCR), , 61,730 (D. Minn. 1977).
317 A contrary rule would give the players' unions unwarranted bargaining power in
that management could not run its business without fear of antitrust liability unless it produced
an agreement with the union. This might unduly force employers to make substantive concessions. Comment, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 23, at 197.
318 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 774-75; Comment, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note
23, at 198-99.
319 See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
320 See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 5.06, at 588-90. In addition to the
situations discussed herein, the management of professional football could face antitrust liability
if it unilaterally establishes rules limiting the return of players from the new United States Football League back to the NFL. See Bowman v. National Football, League, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D.
Minn. 1975).
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of Substantive Antitrust Principles

A court's refusal to grant the exemption should not imply that any
particular contract term or market restraint is a violation of antitrust laws. If a
labor plaintiff has successfully rebuffed management's defense of immunity, he
must still litigate and win the separate and distinct issue of antitrust liability
prior to recovery. The sports cases of the 1970's held that a number ofleague
practices could not survive antitrust scrutiny. 321 Most player restraints,
however, have been modified since that time through union participation in the
collective bargaining process. The exemption, therefore, will preclude antitrust
analysis of most modified practices. Consequently, a detailed antitrust evaluation of all league practices is beyond the scope of this article. 322 But, for those
practices which do not qualify for the exemption,323 the examination of a few
general antitrust principles seems in order.
The unique nature of the sports industry makes the per se rule of liability
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act inappropriate for the imposition of antitrust
damages. The defendant should be entitled to a full rule of reason inquiry prior
to a finding of violation. 324 Aside from the sports context, the rule of reason inquiry is always appropriate when the exemption and the labor law interests i~
herent therein are at issue in a case. 325 The rule of reason requires the court to
evaluate the reasonableness of the restraint within the context of the industry in
which the alleged antitrust violation occurs. 326 As explained by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals:
Under the rule of reason, a restraint must be evaluated to determine whether it is significantly anticompetitive in purpose or effect.
In making this evaluation, a court generally will be required to analyze ,"the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint,
and the reasons why it was imposed." If, on analysis, the restraint is
found to have legitimate business purposes whose realization serves
to promote competition, the "anticompetitive evils" of the challenged practice must be carefully balanced against its "procompetitive virtues" to ascertain whether the former outweigh the latter. A
321 See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v.
National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
322 For a full antitrust examination of many of the significant player restraints embodied
in the NFL-NFLPA Colletive Bargaining Agreement executed in 1977, see Comment, UCLA L.
REv., supra note 223, at 262-68.
323 See supra notes 264-73 and accompanying text.
32+ See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. But see Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 892-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hocky Club, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 503 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Denver Rockets v. AllPro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-66 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
325 Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 510-13.
326 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,63-70 (1911).
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restraint is unreasonable if it has the "net effect" of substantially impeding competition. (footnotes eliminated)327
The Eighth Circuit employs a slightly different formulation of the required
analysis: "The focus of an inquiry under the Rule of Reason is whether the
restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes, and is no more
restrictive than necessary." 328
In the sports context, management frequently has tried to justify player
restraints by claiming they were necessary to maintain competitive balance on
the field. 329 This argument has been consistently rejected as support for the anticompetitive effect of most restraints. 330 Competitive equality among teamseven with significant player restraints - appears illusory, since the same teams
have historically dominated their respective leagues. 331 At minimum, most
restraints therefore have been found to be broader than necessary.332 A sports
league, however, could reasonably contain some player restraints so that
arguable parity of talent would exist within the league, and those franchises in
geographically disadvantageous locations would receive assistance in fielding
teams. 333 Therefore, although some carefully drawn player restraints could
satisfy the reasonableness standard, practices which have the effect of unduly
depressing player salaries, restricting player freedom of movement for a significant period of time or vesting unrestricted control over a player to mana'gement, seem suspect under the rule of reason. 334 Management would be well advised to ensure union participation in the formulation of any rules or practices
which arguably produce such effects. Union involvement would greatly
enhance the possibility of exemption and, by tempering the effect of the
restraint, increase its reasonableness within the industry.

C. The Future Role of Labor Law
As management and labor in the sports industry mature and establish
some equality of power, resort to antitrust law should diminish and the traditional principles oflabor law should provide the pre-eminent method for resolving disputes. The structure offederallabor law, including the full implementation of unfair labor practices and mandatory subjects of bargaining,335 should
Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976).
329 See, e.g., id. at 621-22; Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186-87 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); and Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 79-80 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
qff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978).
330 See, e.g., cases cited Slfpra note 329.
m See Burkow & Slaughter, supra note 300, at 318.
332 See cases cited supra note 329.
m See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280,286-87 (8th Cir. 1978); Robertson v. National Basketball Association, 556 F.2d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 1977).
m See]. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 18, § 5.07(e), at 621-29.
m 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), (b), (d) (1976). For a more detailed discussion, see supra notes
327
328
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be applied to sports with the same force they possess in the non-athletic business world. 336 This process has already occurred to a large extent in the sports
industry.337 In addition to the statutory labor law remedies, most collective
bargaining agreements provide for the arbitration of grievances. 33s The growing number of sports arbitration decisions indicates that many members of the
sports community are seeking redress through this proven labor law device. 339
Thus, administrative law judges and arbitrators should replace the judicial
system as the most significant force in resolving management-labor disputes in
the future. 34o
The sports industry contains a potential for the application of traditional
labor law concepts in some unusual settings. Sports leagues bargain collectively
for fringe benefits and conditions of employment, but, unlike most businesses,
allow the individual player to bargain his own salary directly with management. Players' unions, because of the principle of exclusivity,341 could
eliminate this individual bargaining and insist on league wide wage scales. In
the wake of the football union's failure to gain such a scale in bargaining with
management,342 however, professional sports unions apparently will continue
to waive exclusivity in their bargaining agreements and allow salaries to be individually negotiated. 343
This dual system of negotiation means that management potentially faces
a double obligation of good faith bargaining - collectively with the union

87, 261 and accompanying text.
336 See Jacobs and Winter, supra note 290, at 1-2.
337 Management and labor have begun to call on federal mediators for bargaining
assistance and have also begun, with increasing frequency, to me unfair labor practices with the
NLRB against each other. See, e.g., Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations
Comm., 516 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Janofsky, Privacy Invaded, Players Charge, THE
SPORTING NEWS, April 26, 1982, at 50, cols. 2-3 (football).
338 See, e.g., NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. VII (Non-Injury
Grievance) and Art. IX (Injury Grievance) (1977-1982) (available at Boston College Law School
Library).
339 PRAC. L. INST., REpRESENTING PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES AND TEAMs 1981
(PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
No. 135), at 383-85 (1981). Unfortunately, most of these decisions are unreported.
3iO The Basic Agreement between the American and National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs and the MLBPA even provides for arbitration of salary disputes for some players
in Art. V, § F (available at Boston College Law School Library).
SH Section 9(a) of the NLRA makes the union the exclusive representative of the unit's
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for the
employer to refuse to bargain with the employee representative. !d. § t58(a)(5). The union can
even invalidate pre-existing individual employment contracts. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
332,339 (1944). See R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, at 374-78; Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 799.
Si2 See supra note 312 and accompanying text. The NFLPA is reportedly pursuing an unfair labor practice charge against the NFL for conducting individual negotiations with players
after the July 15, 1982, expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Balzer, A New Can of
Wonns, THE SPORTING NEWS, August 23, 1982, at 39, col. 1.
3iS See supra note 27 and accompanying text. In addition to the waiver, most collective
agreements provide that a player may be represented in salary negotiations. These clauses
solidify the status of player agents. A league-wide wage scale would eliminate, to a large extent, a
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when the underlying agreement expires every four or five years, and individually with some players every year. The NLRA makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. 344 Does this obligation attach to individual negotiations
when they are authorized by the union or is the conduct of a team in individual
bargaining controlled by the terms of the bargaining agreement?345 The answer
to this question determines whether a team possesses the good {aith bargaining
obligation regardless of the collective agreement's wording and whether an individual player's remedy for a perceived violation of such a duty is an unfair
labor practice charge or an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the agreement's
grievance procedure. 346 In addition, the meaning of the obligation, regardless
of the proper remedy~ has not been clearly defined. A team may be violating
good faith bargaining in the individual context if it offers a player a benefit for
firing his individual agent347 or colludes with another league to limit a player's
mobility or conspires with other teams to establish a league-wide salary scale
rather than negotiating the individual merits of the player. 348 Any of these
practices possibly could subject a club to a grievance or an unfair labor practice
charge based on a failure to individually negotiate in good faith.
Labor law remedies may also assist players in breaking the wall of secrecy
management traditionally has erected regarding fmancial matters of the
league. Good faith bargaining requires that an employer substantiate representations made to a union, particularly when the representation is a claim of
fmancial inability to pay the union's requested package. 349 This idea has been
somewhat expanded to include claims that a proposed wage or benefit is fair. 350
The union may also obtain access to documents needed to possess a grievance
or to effectively function as an exclusive bargaining representative. 351 A
players' union may therefore be increasingly able to obtain information regarding the true financial structure of the league. 352 In addition, if the Section
player's need for an individual agent.
3H 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
3i5 Most sports industry collective bargaining agreements state that teams will bargain
individually with players "in good faith." See, e.g., NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. XXII, § 9 (1977-1982) (available at Boston College Law School Library).
346 Courts will often favor the grievance arbitration as the appropriate remedy. United
Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
347 This circumstance reportedly occurred between the Buffalo Bills football club and
one of their linebackers, Jim Haslett. Balzer, Let's Make a Deal, THE SPORTING NEWS, September
5, 1981, at 56, cols. 1-3.
348 The NFL owners allegedly set a league-wide wage scale for rookies. See NFLPA
PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 28-9.
349 National Labor Relations Board v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee, 516 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
350 General Elec. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 466 F.2d 1177,1184 (6th Cir.
1972).
351 Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. and Oil, Chern. and Atomic Workers Local No.
6-418, 261 NLRB No.2 (April 9, 1982).
352 The NFLPA is attempting to obtain financial information regarding the NFL,

March 1983]

MATURING SPORTS INDUSTRY

387

8(a)(5) obligation extends to individual negotiations, a player may be able to
force a team to document its claimed inability to pay a certain wage or to reveal
contracts of its current players if it claims a salary demand would disrupt its
present salary structure. 353
Finally, the expansive interpretation being given to mandatory subjects of
bargaining may influence sports negotiations. 354 As players seek greater control over the rules of the game or the surfaces on which they are played,355 the
extension of the mandatory area to include such topics would force management to negotiate with the unions regarding changes the union seeks. 356 A
union may be able to compel management to bargain over the manner in
which the teams share their TV revenue if the union can demonstrate the requisite impact upon wages in the league. 357 Union participation in the molding
of such rules would also ephance the possibility of exemption and limit management's antitrust liability regarding such practices. Both parties therefore
may be forced to adjust their conduct as the increasing pre-eminence of labor
law adjusts the rules of the game. 358

II: LABOR -

LABOR

Emerging sports unions, with the power to negotiate meaningfully with
management to produce bargaining agreements which reflect collective negotiation, occupy a position whereby their decisions and operations can seriously
affect the economic well-being of players. This increased union status is accompanied by an increased potential for liability from lawsuits by players charging
the union with a breach of its duty to represent fairly all of its members. Indeed, the possibility of such litigation appears even greater in the sports industry than the non-sports setting because a significant number of individual
players, possessing financial resources sufficient to support a lawsuit, listen to
the advice of people who can be anti-union in their sentiments - the agents. 359

especially the details of its contracts with the broadcast industry, through the unfair labor practice
mechanism. See Balzer, A Victory for the Players, THE SPORTING NEWS, April 24, 1982, at 50, col.
1.
353 See Closius, Early signers set salary structure, 25 PRO FOOTBALL WEEKLY, No. 29, June
1982, at 45-46.
3H See Handler and Zifchak, supra note 49, at 502.
355 See, e.g., the NFLPA Proposed Collective Bargaining Demands, 1982, at 13-14
(demanding player participation in rules affecting safety and the use of artificial turf) (available at
Boston College Law School Library).
356 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 794.
357 See supra notes 311-12 and accompanying text. Management might be able to avoid
bargaining by contending that revenue distribution is an appropriate incident of entrepreneurial
control and, hence, not a subject for bargaining with labor. Fibreboard Paper Prod., Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 379 U.S. 203, 217-26 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
358 An increased labor law emphasis will likely lessen the paternalistic attitude
characteristic of earlier sports management and hasten the treatment of the sports industry as a
traditional, profit-oriented enterprise. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
359 Football again seems to possess the greatest antagonism between players union and
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The existence of this agent-player relationship may, in the future, lead to
another area of intra-labor strife - the union's regulation of player agents. 360

A. The Duty of Fair Representation
The union is the exclusive labor representative for all members of the
bargaining unit, including non-union employees. 361 In conjunction with this
status, labor law imposes on the union the duty to represent fairly all of the
members of its unit. 362 This obligation is imposed on the union in its negotiation of the bargaining agreement and its administration of the provisions
(especially grievance and arbitration proceedings) of the agreement during its
term. 363 The Supreme Court first defined this duty in Steele, v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Company.364 In Steele, the union, elected pursuant to. the Railway Labor Act, did not allow blacks to be members and bargained for terms
which would exclude blacks from jobs as firemen.365 The Court noted that the
union must represent all members of the unit, not just the majority which
elected it. 366 In exercising this function, the Steele Court held the union could
not discriminate "among employees based solely on racial considerations; such
conditions were deemed invidious and irrelevant to economic or labor distinctions. 367 The Court, in a subsequent case, imposed a similar duty on unions
subject to the NLRA.368
Vaca v. Sipes3 69 provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to further
explain the scope of a union's duty to represent all unit members. Sipes, the
administrator of a deceased employee's estate, pursued a claim against the
union based on the union's failure to process a grievance. 370 Sipe's decedent
was allegedly fired improperly by Swift & CO.371 The union went through four
levels of arbitration but declined to process a fifth level and dismissed the
grievance, based on a determination of insufficient medical evidence. 372 The
agents. A group of agents were sued by the .union because of their efforts to establish a rival
union. Upshaw v. Trope, Civil Action No. 80-03680 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 20, 1980). The NFLPA's
current bargaining proposal would have eliminated the need for footbal agents. See supra notes
341-43 and accompanying text.
360 Aside from these two areas of liability, a players union may also be named as a
defendant in an antitrust action by a player, league or owner. Liability in that context would involve the exemption principles discussed in detail in part I of this article.
361 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See also, Roberts and Powers, supra note 29, at 457.
362 See].. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 18, § 5.05(b), at 545.
363 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
364 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
365 !d. at 194-95.
366 ld. at 203.
367 !d. Unions were there held to have an equal protection duty similar to that which the
Constitution imposes on the states. ld.
368 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
369 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
370 !d. at 173-74.
371 !d.
372 !d. at 175.
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Vaca Court decided that the exclusive representative status given the union
"includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without
hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete
good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." 373 The Court
declared that a union breached this standard when its conduct towards a
member of the bargaining unit was "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith."374 The Court therefore held that a union "may not arbitrarily ignore a
meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion. . . ." 375 This
characterization of the duty broadened the union's liability from the equal protection notion of Steele. The Vaca Court, however, also noted the need to protect
the integrity of the grievance procedure and to allow the union discretion to
refuse to process frivolous claims. 376 The failure of Sipes to prove arbitrary or
bad faith conduct on the union's part dictated the conclusion that the union
had not breached its duty. 377
The standard envisioned by the Supreme Court vests much discretion in
the union regarding substantive representation decisions. 378 A union inevitably
must resolve issues about which members of the unit disagree. The union can
side with one group of employees when that group's interests conflicts with
those of another group,379 but it must make decisions between conflicting
employee interests based upon reasons related to legitimate industrial considerations. 38o Subject to the limits of good faith and honesty of purpose, the

373 The Court also noted that in Miranda'Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the NLRB held that a union's breach ofits fair representation duty was an unfair labor practice. !d. The Vaca opinion, however, rejected-the argument
that Miranda meant that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over such suits. !d. at 176-77.
37+ !d. at 190. See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 799.
375 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). See Cheit, Competing Models of Fair Representation: The Perfunctory Processing Cases, 24 B.C. L. REv. 1 (1982).
376 [d.
377 !d. at 193-95. The Court indicated that a breach could have occurred if, when
presented with relevant medical evidence, the union had ignored the complaint or processed it
perfunctorily. !d. at 194. In addition, a breach may have occurred if a union officer was personally hostile to an employee and that individual animus influenced union decisions. !d.
378 See]. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 5.05(b), at 546.
379 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50. The Humphrey Court declared:
"[W]e are not ready to fmd a breach of the collective bargaining agent's duty offair
representation in taking a good faith position contrary to that of some individuals
whom it represents nor in supporting the position of one group of employees against
that of another .... Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous
grievances which would only clog the grievance process, so it must be free to take a
position on the not so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be neutralized when the issue
is chiefly between two sets of employees. Conflict between employees represented by
the same union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the union in these cases would
surely weaken the collective bargaining and grievance processes.
!d.
380 [d. at 338-39. The Court reasoned:
Variations acceptable in the discretion of bargaining representatives, however, may
well include differences based upon such matters as the unit within such seniority is
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union is to be given a "wide range of reasonableness" in fulfilling its statutory
duty.381 The authority to negotiate permits the union to make concessions and
conclude agreements which it feels will best serve the majority of the unit's
members.382
Individual athletes are therefore limited in their ability to challenge a
union's decision to grant management a substantive concession which works to
the economic disadvantage of a particular group of athletes. 383 The good faith
standard would appear to insulate the union even when the concession works to
the disadvantage of the entire unit. 384 The duty may be violated, however, if
the union arbitrarily favors the interests of one group of players over those of
another.385 This duty may be an increasing problem for unions as manageto be computed; the privileges to which it shall relate, the nature of the work, the
time at which it is done, the fitness, ability or age of the employees, their family
responsibilities, injuries received in course of service, and time or labor devoted to
related public service, whether civil or military, voluntary or involuntary.
[d. See also Jacobs and Winter, supra note 290, at 18.
381 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). In Huffman, the Court
stated:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any
negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The
mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete
satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the
unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in
the exercise of its discretion.
/d.
382 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-338 (1953). The Court concluded:
Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a delegation to the
negotiators of a discretion to make such concessions and accept such advantage as,
in the light of all relevant considerations, they believe will best serve the interests of
the parties represented. A major responsibility of negotiators is to weigh the relative
advantages and disadvantages of differing proposals. A bargaining representative,
under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, often is a labor organization
but it is not essential that it be such. The employees represented often are members
of the labor organization which represents them at the bargaining table, but it is not
essential that they be such. The bargaining representative, whoever it may be, is
responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests of whom it represents.

/d.

J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 5.05(b), at 547.
[d. (citing the employees' interest in the long term health of the sports industry as
supporting union concessions favoring management).
385 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967); see also infra note 387 and accompanying
text. The NFLPA may be approaching a violation of this type in its treatment of draftees and its
refusal to bargain for certain players after it precluded individual negotiation. After the July 15
expiration date had passed, the union took the position that unsigned veterans could accept a
team's pre-July 15 best offer at any time and report to training camp. Unsigned draftees,
however, were told that they could not accept the club's last offer, but had to wait until a new collective agreement was negotiated before they could sign individual contracts. The few draftees
unsigned before July 15 were therefore, as a group, the only persons prevented from playing. See
Stellino, Top Drqft Picks, Agents Feel Trapped, THE SPORTING NEWS, July 26, 1982, at 50. Such action could be characterized as arbitrary. Despite the union's ban, two first round picks, Marcus
Allen of the Raiders and Damn Nelson of the Vikings, accepted the club's last pre-July 15 offer
383

384
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ment, experiencing hard times or anticipating future economic adversity,
presses for substantive concessions which would reduce or limit player
salaries. 386 Unions may also face increased liability as lower courts interpret the
"arbitrary" portion of the Vaca enunciation to include union activity which
borders on a finding of negligence. 387 This broadening of the union's duty
could allow a dissatisfied group of athletes to challenge the reasonableness of a
union concession or settlement. 388
A fmal issue regarding the duty of fair representation concerns a draftee's
standing to allege its breach. The available labor law precedent is split on the
issue of whether a union owes a duty to individuals who are not within its
unit. 389 Prior to execution of a league player contract, the draftee arguably is
not a member of the unit. 390 He therefore could be prohibited from suing the
union for breach of its duty regarding the negotiation or enforcement of terms
and provisions which affect his economic interests. 391 Although this conclusion
is supportable considering available precedent,392 a result stating that the
union owes no duty to draftees must be harmonized with the draftees' status in

and signed after the expiration date. The union is flling unfair labor practice charges against the
teams based on these signings. Balzer, A New Can oj Worms, THE SPORTING NEWS, August 23,
1982, at 39, col. 1. A veteran Detroit Lions running back, Billy Sims, is also threatening litigation because he wants to extend his contract and the Lions claim they cannot negotiate with him.
Sylvester, Sims' new lawyer snarls at Lions, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 13, 1982, § D. at 1, cols.
2-3. The general animus the union seems to have towards draftees may eventually be the basis of
a lawsuit alleging breach of this duty. See supra note 298 for a discussion of the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement'~ expiration on July 15, 1982, except for the collegiate draft, the
principles of which continue until 1986. See Burkow and Slaughter, supra note 300, at 336-37.
386 The NBA, in its negotiations with the Players Association, is apparently asking the
union to acknowledge the precarious fmancial posture of the league and accept limitations on
player salaries and guaranteed contracts. Douchant, Hoop Scoop, THE SPORTING NEWS, August
16, 1982, at 54, col. 3.
387 See R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, Ch. 30, § 7, at 719-21. Bad faith is not necessary for a
finding of breach of duty if the union's activity appears to be unreasonable or irrational. Jones v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974); Griffin v. International Union,
United Automobile, A. & A.I.W., 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972).
388 The NFLPA again appears to be in the most precarious position of all players unions
as salaries in arguably the most profitable league have not risen relative to those of players in
other sports.
389 For cases implying such a duty, see Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard,
343 U.S. 768 (1952); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177
(1941); Bell & Howell Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 598 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974). For cases implying that only a
member of the bargaining unit can institute such a suit, see Chemical Workers & Alkalic
Workers of Am. Local Union No.1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); Grayv.
Heat and Int'l Ass'n of Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers Local No. 51, 416 F.2d 313 (6th
Cir. 1969); Schick v. National Labor Relations Board, 409 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1969); National
Labor Relations Board v. Whiting Milk Co., 342 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1965).
390 See supra notes 289-300 and accompanying text regarding inclusion of draftees as
parties to the bargaining relationship for exemption purposes.
391 See Roberts and Powers, supra note 24, at 458-59; Burkow and Slaughter, supra note
300, at 336.
392 See supra note 389.
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connection with the exemption. Draftees could be characterized as outside the
unit for purposes of the union's duty, but as a party to the bargaining relationship for purposes of the exemption. These inconsistent applications of law
would leave the class of draftees without a remedy or a means of safeguarding
their interests under either labor or antitrust law. 393

B. Union Regulation

of Agents

Agents of individual players, for the most part, are not subject to the
regulation or control of any group or entity.39~ Reports of unscrupulous or incompetent agents occasionally have led sports unions to consider licensing or
policing agent practices and qualifications. 395 For example, the recently concluded football bargaining agreement contains a provision that only agents certified by the union will be allowed to negotiate contracts for veteran players. 396
Union control of agents' activities would apparently be immune from antitrust
scrutiny due to the statutory labor exemption. 397 The recent Supreme Court
decision in H.A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Association398 supports
this conclusion. In Actors' Equity, the actors' union regulated the activities of
theatrical agents in detail, including a limitation on commissions charged, the
avoidance of conflicts of interests and the preservation of the actor's ability to
terminate the relationship.399 The union also charged agents a franchise fee in
order to obtain a license. Union members could only employ agents who had
received the sanction of the union. ~oo
A unanimous Court concluded that the agents were, in fact, a "labor
group" as defmed by federal Iaw.~ol The disagreement between the agents and
the union was therefore a "labor dispute" as defmed by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and entitled to the statutory exemption. ~02 The Court supported its conclusion by pointing to its prior opinion in American Federation of Musicians v.
Ca"ol/,4°3 wherein orchestra leaders were characterized as a "labor group. "40~
The test regarding the validity of any particular regulation was thus whether

393 Of course, a pro-draftee inconsistency could occur whereby the draftee was a member of the unit for breach of duty purposes, but not a party to the relationship for exemption purposes. This application of the inconsistency seems equally unappe.aling,
394 See infra notes 441-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the State of California's new sta~te regulating agents.
395 Set' FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITEE ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R.
DOC. No. 94-1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1977); Montgomery, The Spectacular Rise and Ignoble
Fall oj Ricluzrd Sorkin, Pros' Agent, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1977, § 5, at 1.
396 See infra note 408.
397 See Berry and Gould, supra note 1, at 803.
398 451 U.S. 704 (1981).
399 Id. at 706-10.
400 Id.
401 Id. at 719-22.
402 Id. at 731.
f03 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
fOf H.A. Artists & Ass'n, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 717-22 (1981).
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the rule furthers the union's legitimate labor interest. 405 In light of Actors' Equi9', therefore, player unions could engage in extensive regulation of agents for
union members and not be subject to antitrust sanctions. Management's
refusal to deal with agents who fail to comply with such union regulations
would also appear to be immune from antitrust attack. 406 Since, however,
agents and first-year players ("rookies") contract prior to the player's becoming a member of the union,407 attempted regulation of agents for rookies may
subject the teams or the union or both to antitrust liability. 408 Therefore, the
union's ability to enforce effectively its restrictions might be severely limited if
potential antitrust liability forces the union to exempt agents for rookies from
coverage.

III.

MANAGEMENT - MANAGEMENT

Management disputes can arise in two different contexts - a new league
challenging the rules and practices of an established league, or an individual
owner or small group of owners attacking the majority rules of their own
league. The league-against-Ieague lawsuit has been the most common form of
past management strife,409 but litigation initiated by a dissatisfied owner appears to be an increasing possibility. 410 The batde in either situation is likely to
involve principles of antitrust law since the exemption has been perceived as
having litde application in a purely management dispute. 411 In both the inter-

405 The Court also concluded that, since the franchise fees did not serve a labor purpose,
they were not exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Three mebers of the Court dissented from this
holding. Id. at 722.
405 See supra notes 61-277 and accompanying text.
407 See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
408 See supra notes 290-300 and accompanying text. The recendy concluded NFL
NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement limits union certification to agents of veteran players.
Agents for rookies need not be certified. See Stellino, MaJor Points in New Agreement, THE SORTING
NEWS, November 29, 1982, at 41, cols. 1-2.
409 See, e.g., North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d
Cir. 1982); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (B.D. Pa. 1972).
410 See, e.g., Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978) (power of
baseball Commissioner to void sales of players); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
National Football League, 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.
1980) (court of appeals reversed granting of preliminary injunction which would have allowed the
Oakland Raiders to move to Los Angeles). See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm. v.
National Football League, 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (directed verdict for Raiders and
Coliseum on NFL's single entity defense).
411 If a new league is affected by the restraint, the agreement has extra-unit effect and
would not be protected by the exemption. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text. See also
J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 18, § 5.05(h), at 566-67. If a maverick owneris the plaintiff, the inapplicability of the exemption is less clear. Since most such challenges involve provisions within a league's Constitution and By-Laws rather than its collective bargaining agreement, the needed affiliation between a challenged term and either labor interests or the bargaining process may be missing. The exemption was not considered in the opinions regarding the
Oakland Raiders cited supra note 410.
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or intra-league suit, the complaint can allege violations of either Section 1 or 2
of the Sherman Act or both such provisions. m IT Section 2 is the focus of the
litigation, the charge of monopolization mandates that the plaintiff
demonstrate that the defendants possess monopoly power in a relevant market,
and that they have willfully acquired and maintained such power. m If Section
1 is the central issue before the court, the rule of reason inquiry should be
preferred over the' per se rules.414 The rule of reason principles to' be employed
are similar to those enunciated in the labor-management decisions.•15 Traditional antitrust principles will therefore govern lawsuits between management
entities.
Recently, the National Football League has been !lubject to both types of
management disputes. In North American Soccer League v. National Football League4 16
and Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League,m the
football league, concerned about its potential antitrust exposure,418 tried to insulate its rules from traditional Section 1 liability by arguing that the league
was a single economic entity which, by definition, could not be guilty of the
joint or conspiratorial restraint proscribed by the statute. 419 North American Soccer League (NASL) involved a suit in which the newer soccer league challenged
an NFL Constitution and By-Law provision which prohibited NFL owners
from owning a team in anotheJ..: professional sport. 420 In Los Angeles Coliseum, a
Los Angeles stadium and AI Davis, owner of the Oakland 'l~. aiders, challenged
an NFL Constitution and By-Law provision which prohibit~d an owner from
<,
H2 See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 3St F. Supp. 402,
503 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
m Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Clubl Inc., 351 F.
Supp. at 505. See also J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 18, § 5.11, at 691.
i1+ See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
itS See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
i16 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
H7 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (appeal pending).
itS The NFL faces additional threats from its owners. The Raiders' move to Los
Angeles was reportedly at least partly inspired by its desire to attack the NFL's rule requiring
equal participation in broadcast revenue. The Raiders' ability to retain income from cable television football broadcasts in the Los Angeles area, if they occur in the future, would greatly profit
the club. See supra notes 3,311 and accompanying text. The NFL may face additional antitrust
exposure from the new football league, the USFL. The first potential issue between the leagues,
the ability of the NFL to prevent the USFL from playing in NFL stadiums, will apparently be
avoided since most USFL teams are being allowed to lease NFL stadiums if they so desire. See
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), eert denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
U9 North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d
Cir. 1982); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519 F.
Supp. 581, 582-85 (C.D. Cal. 1981). See also Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
281 (1981) and Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
i20 NFL Constitution and By-Laws, Art. IX, § 4, quoted,in North Am. Soccer League v.
National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1255 (2d Cir. 1982). Certain NFL owners possessed
majority interests in NASL teams and the soccer league was reluctant to lose their wealth and
prestige. !d. at 1254-55.
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relocating his franchise without the approval of three-fourths of the league's
owners.-i21
In both cases, the NFL lost on its "single entity" argument. 422 The
district court in NASL agreed with the single entity analysis, but the Second
Circuit reversed-i23 by noting that the Supreme Court has never favored a
"joint venture" antitrust exemption. 424 The circuit court looked to prior
Supreme Court cases (involving a variety of factual settings) in which Section 1
had been applied to sports leagues, and concluded that the instant context was
indistinguishable from that precedent. 425 The cross-ownership ban not only
protected the league from other league competition, but also shielded individual teams from home territory competition. 426 The Second Circuit
therefore reasoned that the individual nature of the restraint precluded any entity exemption. 427 The'District Court in Los Angeles Coliseum also rejected the
NFL claim.428 The lower court granted the plaintiff s summary judgment motion on the single entity defense for three reasons: 1) indistinguishable sports
precedent had applied Section 1 to sports leagues;429 2) Supreme Court rejection of such claims where the: organization's product was as unitary as the
NFL's and required the same degree of cooperation from organization
membership;430 and 3) individual team distinctions whereby each was a
separate business entity with independent value,431 although collectively
operating within a league structure to produce a product. Subsequendy, the
jury in Los Angeles Coliseum found in favor of the plaintiffs regarding the
substantive violation of the Sherman Act. 432
The rejection of the '-'single entity" argument will have an important influence on pure management suits of the future. If the argument had been acm NFL Constitution and By-Laws, Art. IV, § 3, quoted in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1199, n.l (9th Cir. 1980).
m North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d
Cir. 1982); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519 F.
Supp. 581, 582-85 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
m North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 505 F. Supp. 672, 688-89
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), rcv'd, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d Cir. 1982).
m !d. at 1257.
425 !d.
426 !d.
m !d. at 1257-58. The court concluded that the provision violated the rule of reason
because the alleged pro-competitive effects of the ban could not outweigh its obvious anticompetitive effects. !d. at 1261.
428 Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519 F.
Supp. 581, 582-85 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
429 !d. at 583. The Court rejected the NFL's contention that the player restraint cases involved a different market and were therefore distinguishable. !d.
430 !d. at 583-84.
431 !d. at 584. For additional discussion on the single entity issue and its complications,
see Blecher and Daniels, supra note 20.
m Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, No.
78-3523-HP (C.D. Cal., May 7, 1982) [reported at 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REp. (BNA)
1160 Qune 3, 1982)].
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cepted, sports leagues would have been substantially immune from antitrust
liability. The single entity defense could have precluded Section 1 suits by comp'etitors and the exemption would have precluded most suits by labor
entities. 433 Thus, the rejection of the single entity defense in both of the recent
football decisions indicates that the internal rules and procedures of the various
leagues are subject to antitrust scrutiny when challenged by either a rival
league or a maverick owner. The league's effort to avoid the imposition of
traditional antitrust principles to sports has apparently been unsuccessful. 434
The industry will therefore be subject to the same antitrust liability applicable
to profit-oriented businesses of similar stature. The leagues receive some protection, however, from the possible satisfaction of the rule of reason standard.
Liability should only be imposed upon an established league following a complete analysis of the reasonableness of a restraint, including its motivation,
necessity and effect in a unique business environment.
IV. GOVERNMENT - THE SPORTS INDUSTRY

The consumers of professional sports - the fans - have few effective
ways of influencing the decisions of the industry. Governmental regulation of
the sports business, therefore, would arguably be the best method of safeguarding the interests of the public. The United States Congress, however, has traditionally viewed professional sports in a manner similar to that employed by the
judicial system prior to the 1970's - as recreational amusements rather than a
legitimate industry. Hence, federal sports legislation, although generally
limited to the field of antitrust law, has frequently granted concessions to the
leagues which the owners claimed were necessary for the good of the game. 435
Most sports legislation adopted by Congress has granted certain sports activities specific exemption from federal antitrust laws, including the ability of
sports teams to negotiate jointly league broadcast contracts and the right of two
leagues to merge into one. 436 Moreover, the Senate is currently considering a
bill which would grant to certain league rules immunity from the workings of
the antitrust laws. 437 The proposed bill purports to protect the fans' interest in
geographic stability and comparable economic opportunities for all teams.438 If
the bill passes, the antitrust principles discussed earlier would no longer be ap-

m See supra, part I of this article.
But see irifra note 440 and accompanying text.

+Sf

+35

This does not include tax-related legislation. See supra note 28 and accompanying

+36

Sports Broadcasting Act, and Merger Addition thereto, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295

text.
(1976).

t37 Sports Antitrust Bill, S 2784, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), 128 CONGo REa. S
9330-31 (daily ed. July 28, 1982). The core of the bill concerns restrictions on franchise movement.
+38 Sports Antitrust Bill, S 2784, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1982), 128 CONGo REa. S
9330-31 (daily ed. July 28, 1982).
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plicable to future disputes regarding those practices. 439 The proposed statute is
clearly inconsistent with the modern conception of sports adopted by other
branches of the legal system. Such legislation countermands the treatment of
sports as a business on an equal footing with other profit-making endeavors.
The merits of such a bill should be evaluated not on the basis of the "good of
the game" or the benefit to team owners but on the same consumer protection
standard which Congress applies to any other industry or product. The Congressional perception of the legal posture of professional athletics should
change to reflect the modern realities of the sports industry and to harmonize
the legal status accorded sports. Such a transformation also is required if the interests of the fans are to receive any form of national protection.
Due to the interstate nature of the leagues, state legislatures have been
reluctant to regulate athletic activities within their borders.Ho California, however, has recendy entered this field by passing the first statute to regulate comprehensively sports agents operating within that state. HI The act requires an
agent to file an application with the state Labor Commissioner accompanied by
affidavits of two individuals that the applicant is a person of good moral character or, if the applicant is a corporation, that it has a reputation for fair
dealing. H2 The agent must also submit a copy of his agency contract and fee
schedules to the Commissioner for approval. H3 The agent must maintain certain records and keep them available for inspection. H4 A $10,000 surety bond
must also be filed with the Commissioner. 445 Finally, the agent must file a copy
of his registration certificate with a secondary or collegiate institution prior to
contacting any student at that school. H6 If a student signs with an agent, the
agent must file a copy of the representation agreement with the school within
five days of execution. 4407 The act clearly covers agents based in CaIifornia, but
it is uncertain whether agents located in other states, soliciting athletes in
California schools or negotiating with California teams, must comply. In addition, the statute provides an exception for "any member of the State Bar of
California when acting as legal counsel for any person.' '4408 Attorneys admitted
in other states should implicidy receive a similar exception, assuming the
representation of athletes is included within the notion of' 'legal counseL" This
type of legislation may evidence a willingness on the part of state government
See supra notes 409-34 and accompanying text.
State laws, particularly antitrust statutes, cannot burden the interstate commerce
aspects of sports. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972); Robertson v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
HI California Labor Code, West's Annotated Calif. Codes, §§ 1500, 1510-1547 (1981
Supp., 1971 edition).
442 !d. § 1511.
H5 Id. §§ 1530, 1531.
444 !d. §§ 1532, 1533.
H5 Id. § 1519.
446 !d. § 1545.
447 !d.
He !d. § 1500(b).
439

440
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to police, at least to a limited extent, the public interest aspect of the sports industry.
An alternative source for public regulation of the sports industry may
come from the power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domain'm,ay
allow local governments to influence the future conduct of their area team. The
California Supreme Court recently ruled that a trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to the Oakland Raiders in an eminent domain suit brought
against the team by the City of Oakland. 449 Oakland initiated the action in an
effort to keep the team from moving to Los Angeles. 45O The California
Supreme Court noted that intangible property is a proper subject for the eminent domain power if the condemnation is for a valid "public use. "451 The
court refused to find that the operation of a football team was an illegitimate
public use as a matter of law. 452 The opinion noted that municipal recreational
activities were legitimate public purposes. 453 Pursuant to that rationale, counties and municipalities have frequently condemned land to build sports
stadiums to be leased to teams. 454 The property, the collection of rights which
form the franchise, also had a clear situs within Oakland's city limits.m The
court concluded, therefore, that the city possessed a viable claim that the
Raiders could be the subject of an eminent domain proceeding. 456 The
Supreme Court then remanded the case to the trial court for a determination
on the issue of public use, with appropriate deference to be given to the city's
decision. 457
The California court's decision implies that a city, through its eminent domain power, can prevent a sports franchise from moving or can eliminate an
owner which it deems irresponsible. This power appears particularly broa9
since the court also granted the city the ability to condemn the team and immediately sell it to another owner. 458 Such a holding would appear to limit
severely an owner's right to control his own property. However, most of the
perceived restrictions on the incidents of ownership are, in reality, questions of
fair and adequate compensation. Thus, the question not yet faced by the
California courts is that of valuation. If the city were allowed to purchase the
Raiders at a "bargain basement" price, the decision would have a disruptive
effect on the sports capital market. Conversely, if the city pays the current fair
market value of the franchise,459 the degree to which any particular owner is in-

City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal.3d 656 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1982).
at 659.
451
at 662-64.
m
at 665-68.
m
at 666.
H9

4SO

454

m
456

m
458
459

/d.
[d.
/d.
[d.
/d.
[d.
/d.
[d.
/d.

at 670.
at 670-71.
at 671.
at 669.
This evaluation should include some evaluation of future earnings potential.
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jured is lessened considerably. Although the owner would be deprived of the
psychic value of owning a sports team, the fmancial loss would be minimal.
The owner's property, in the economic sense, would remain intact.
The Raiders case, therefore, may represent the beginning of a new relationship between a team and its home territory. The sports industry of the
future may need to be much more sensitive to the organization's fans and the
fmancial investment which the community has, even if indirecdy, placed in the
franchise. Although an expansion of the eminent domain power will lessen
some of the joys of team ownership, a proper application of the public use doctrine and a fair valuation of the franchise's true worth should protect the owner
from most potential abuses. 46o Suits of this nature may provide the most direct
method for the fans - the product's consumers - to share some of the
leagues' power and shape the future structure of the industry.
CONCLUSION

For most of its history, profession<!1 athletics was governed by the unilateral decisions of team owners acting in a league format. In the last twelve years,
however, a variety of sporting groups, through access to the judicial system and
a changed perception of the legal status of sports, have forced the owners to
share the power and wealth derived from the games. Players, unions, agents
and rival leagues all now participate, in some form, in the decisions which will
shape the future of sports. In the course of this growth, the sports industry has
matured into a national business possessed of all the power and problems
which adhere to that status. Future legal disputes between the components of
the industry should be governed by the same general principles of antitrust and
labor law which regulate other profit oriented enterprises of similar magnitude.
The unique nature of professional athletics, however, dictates that certain
traditional concepts be specially adapted to particular sporting contexts.
Mature labor-management relations should be primarily governed by
federal labor law. Collective negotiations, unfair labor practice hearings and
arbitration proceedings - the traditional incidents of labor law - will
therefore replace the court system as the primary focus of future disputes between these parties. Antitrust law, however, should maintain a role in the
regulation of some labor interests in sports. The current formulation of the
labor exemption from antitrust sanctions, embodied in the Mackey-McCourt test,
does not accurately reflect the Supreme Court's enunciation of the nature of
the non-statutory exemption. Future grants of immunity should be based on
the extra-unit effect of the practice, the mandatory nature of bargaining and
union participation in the formulation of the restraint. This test acknowledges

460 Personal dislike of an owner or disagreement with a particular sports decision would
not appear to satisfy the public use standard. The standard should be satisfied only if the team is
leaving the jurisdiction or management is so inept that the economic value of the franchise is being damaged. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal.3d 656, 665 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1982).
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that the interests relevant to the granting of antitrust immunity differ from
those applicable to policing good faith bargaining. The proposed standards,
consistent with Supreme Court rulings, also limit the availability of immuity
and allow for some continuing antitrust role in the regulation oflabor-management relations. Under these standards, therefore, antitrust precepts will retain
an appropriate function in lawsuits involving the rights of collegiate draftees
and unmodified provisions of league Constitutions and By-Laws.
The applicable antitrust and labor principles change as the potential parties to a lawsuit shift. Disputes between labor entities - players, agents or
unions - should be characterized as a labor dispute. Antitrust concepts therefore should have no role in the resolution of such disagreements. Relevant
future inquires will focus instead on the scope of a players' union's duty of fair
representation and the extent to which union regulations further legitimate
labor interests. Disputes between management entities - leagues and owners
- will, on the other hand, be regulated by antitrust law. Labor principles will
normally not be involved as such suits usually challenge restraints with extraunit effects or league rules which have not been the subject of bargaining. The
rejection of the NFL's single entity defense insures that, regarding allegations
of a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the rule of reason remains the
proper legal analysis. Lawsuits between these parties, therefore, will continue
to be resolved by the application of traditional antitrust theory.
The destiny of the sports industry will continue to be shaped by interaction with the legal system. The increasing wealth generated by professional
sports insures future disagreement among the components of the industry
regarding the wealth's proper distribution. The accretion of economic strength
by labor groups will also inspire additional battles with management regarding
control over the industry itself, including such non-economic issues as the actual playing rules and injury related conditions of employment such as
astroturf. Moreover, governmental desire to protect the interests of the fans
(and win votes in the process) guarantees future clashes regarding attempted
regulation of varying facets of the industry. The winners of these competitions,
and the individuals and groups who will mold the future structure of the industry, will not be those who rely on Monday night wisdom regarding the love
of the game; rather, they will be those who understand the rules and strategies
of the real game - the one played in the courts and legislatures.

